Monitoring and punishment networks in an experimental common pool resource dilemma

Abstract

With the aid of a lab experiment, we explored how imperfect monitoring and punishment networks impacted appropriation, punishment and beliefs in a common pool resource appropriation dilemma. We studied the differences between the complete network (with perfect monitoring and punishment, in which everyone can observe and punish everyone else) and two ‘imperfect’ networks (that systematically reduce the number of subjects who could monitor and punish others): the directed and undirected circle networks. We found that free riders were punished in all treatments, but the network topology impacted the type of punishment: the undirected circle induced more severe punishment and prosocial punishment compared to the other two networks. Both imperfect networks were more efficient because the larger punishment capacity available in the complete network elicited higher punishment amount.

Natural Resource Management: A Network Perspective

“…Then, network analysis is used in order to describe the social ties among resource users who have the responsibility to monitor and punish each other in case of non-cooperative behaviour. According to the experimental literature, dense networks can prevent over-appropriation when such action is observed by everyone, but they can also encourage it when punishers struggle to coordinate and monitor non-cooperative behaviours (Shreedhar et al 2020). Thus, identifying the efficient size and structure of the network is fundamental for the sustainable handling of resources.…”

“…In a similar framework, Bodin and Crona (2008) show that homogeneity of the resource users and the social ties formed among them contribute to the successful management of natural resources. In a more recent study, Shreedhar et al (2020) examine experimentally how the different relationships between group members (presented by complete or imperfect networks) can deter or promote over-appropriation depending on the possibilities to coordinate and punish the non-cooperative behaviour.…”

Water Scarcity and Support for Costly Institutions in Public Goods: Experimental Evidence from Cambodia

“…The institutional setting plays an important role in mediating individual and group interests to mitigate risks and impacts of climate change (Agrawal, 2008). A key requirement for successful resource governance-be it formal or informal-is compliance with rules, regulations or norms (Bastakoti and Shivakoti, 2012;Shreedhar et al, 2019;Tavoni et al, 2012). Without effective enforcement of rules and norms, a self-interested individual has no incentive to follow the prescribed rules and norms because doing so is costly to the individual.…”

Community-based monitoring to facilitate water management by local institutions in Costa Rica

“…Externally driven monitoring is common in laboratory experiments, which randomize monitoring to isolate its causal effects (e.g., refs. [12][13][14][15]. Yet whether the insights from Significance Elinor Ostrom won the Nobel Prize in Economics for demonstrating that humans can create rules and institutions that permit sustainable management of shared resources without resorting to privatization or government expropriation.…”