2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2017.11.004
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Monitoring mechanisms, managerial incentives, investment distortion costs, and derivatives usage

Abstract: We relate derivatives usage to the level of corporate governance/monitoring mechanisms, managerial incentives and investment decisions of UK firms. We find evidence to suggest that the monitoring environment, e.g., board size, influences the use of both currency and interest rate derivatives usage. Managerial compensation also influences derivatives usage. Investment decisions are affect by the governance and managerial compensation of firms, which in turn impact on derivatives usage. We find a strong tendency… Show more

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Cited by 23 publications
(10 citation statements)
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References 107 publications
(150 reference statements)
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“…In addition, the Wald Test of Exogeneity is significant in all cases, indicating sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. In our case, the significant Wald Test of Exogeneity suggests that peer firm averages are not exogenous, hence, the need to address potential endogeneity issues via instrumental variables (IV) estimations (see Baum et al, 2003Baum et al, , 2007Huang et al, 2018;Xing et al, 2020). Moreover, the Hansen J-Statistic is small in all our models, suggesting that the null is not rejected and overidentification restrictions are valid (see Sargan, 1958;Baum et al, 2007;Roodman, 2006).…”
Section: Please Insert Table 2 Herementioning
confidence: 75%
“…In addition, the Wald Test of Exogeneity is significant in all cases, indicating sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. In our case, the significant Wald Test of Exogeneity suggests that peer firm averages are not exogenous, hence, the need to address potential endogeneity issues via instrumental variables (IV) estimations (see Baum et al, 2003Baum et al, , 2007Huang et al, 2018;Xing et al, 2020). Moreover, the Hansen J-Statistic is small in all our models, suggesting that the null is not rejected and overidentification restrictions are valid (see Sargan, 1958;Baum et al, 2007;Roodman, 2006).…”
Section: Please Insert Table 2 Herementioning
confidence: 75%
“…In addition to PSM regression, we use an IV-GMM regression to re-test H2 to address possible reverse causality and omitted variable concerns. We prefer the GMM method to the two-stage least squares (2SLS) as GMM provides reliable estimates for inferences from different types of datasets (Hansen, 1982) and the predicted values under 2SLS may not be efficient even if they are consistent (Greene, 2012;Huang et al, 2018).…”
Section: Iv-gmm Regression On H2mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To mitigate against any possible concerns regarding reverse causality and omitted variables, we use an IV-GMM regression (Huang et al, 2018). Following Wang, Duan and Liu (2021) and Banker, Huang & Natarajan (2011), we select the mean of human capital of RMC in the same industry and year as the instrumental variable (INDUS_HCRMC), as the human capital of RMCs at the firm level tends to converge around the industry average (Lev & Sougiannis, 1996).…”
Section: Iv-gmm Regression On H3mentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…allows us to deal with potential endogeneity concerns (Huang et al, 2018). Endogeneity may be a concern in our estimations since portfolio returns and firm characteristics may be endogenous.…”
Section: Iv-gmm Estimatesmentioning
confidence: 99%