2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2010.03.003
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Monitoring technology and firm boundaries: Physician–hospital integration and technology utilization

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Cited by 20 publications
(12 citation statements)
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References 55 publications
(49 reference statements)
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“…Formal tie‐ups between hospitals and physician practices have been shown to strategically alter physicians’ referral patterns and choices over care delivery settings as well as drive higher medical care prices, spending, and treatment intensity—without clear evidence of quality improvements . At the same time, prior studies have also shown technology adoption links to vertical integration as well as increases in Medicaid acceptance following hospital take‐overs of physician practices leaving the net benefits of integration uncertain. Our data cannot inform us if the MU program causally spurred greater vertical integration activity, but they are consistent with the program contributing to the declining appeal of independent practice and therefore adding pressure toward formal integration.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Formal tie‐ups between hospitals and physician practices have been shown to strategically alter physicians’ referral patterns and choices over care delivery settings as well as drive higher medical care prices, spending, and treatment intensity—without clear evidence of quality improvements . At the same time, prior studies have also shown technology adoption links to vertical integration as well as increases in Medicaid acceptance following hospital take‐overs of physician practices leaving the net benefits of integration uncertain. Our data cannot inform us if the MU program causally spurred greater vertical integration activity, but they are consistent with the program contributing to the declining appeal of independent practice and therefore adding pressure toward formal integration.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Economic evaluations published in health economic journals mostly focus on single elements of integrated care [8283848586]. There is need for that to change and health economists to understand the peculiarities of integrated care as intervention under evaluation.…”
Section: Discussion and Research Agendamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In our context, the quality of an agent's performance may be very difficult to determine and agent responsibilities may be shirked in favor of local (community) needs when leadership is decentralized. Whereas research has shown that vertical integration and IT adoption can be complementary when hospitals acquire physician practices (McCullough & Snir, 2010), no research, to our knowledge, has been conducted on how consolidation of IT decision rights and strategic alignment is correlated with IDS IT adoption, standardization, or innovation. Therefore, hospital system integration is a potential solution to the incentive alignment and moral hazard issues that arise with principalY agent problems in health care management (e.g., Robinson, 1997).…”
Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 94%