Monopoly Capital in the time of digital platforms: a radical approach to the Amazon case

Coveri, Andrea; Cozza, Claudio; Guarascio, Dario

doi:10.1093/cje/beac044

Cited by 17 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 65 publications

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“…The super platforms adopt a number of competitive measures such as refusal to deal, self-preference, competition restriction, and stifling mergers and acquisitions in order to consolidate their competitive advantages and raise market entry barriers [23], which will harm competition even if they do not constitute monopolies [24]. According to Coveri et al [25], these forms of market power can also be categorized as market expansion and diversification, data and technology exploitation, labor specialization, and strong negotiating power over the government.…”

Section: Research On the Concept And Evolutionary Motivation Of Doubl...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on the Evolutionary Mechanism of Double-Round Monopoly of Super Platforms in China—Based on Four-Party Evolutionary Game

Ma,

Zhang,

Guo

et al. 2023

Systems

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In recent years, the regulation of double-round monopoly for super platforms has rapidly become a key instrument of the anti-monopoly practice for Internet platforms in China. This paper aims to explore the evolutionary mechanism of double-round monopoly by using evolutionary game theory and constructing a four-party evolutionary game model that includes a super platform, an incumbent platform, a startup platform, and a government regulator, based on considering the micro-dynamic interactions between subjects and the main influencing factors of the evolutionary mechanism using numerical simulation. This study illustrates that the decisions made by each subject and its probability changes affect the evolution rate of double-round monopoly. Depending on the probability of double-round monopoly in the market, government regulators need to be flexible in switching between strict and less-strict regulation strategies to evolve the system to a more desirable, stable state. As well, we conclude that the regulatory strength of the government regulator, the cross-border magnitude of the super platform, the innovation incentive subsidy of the startup platform, and the synergistic risk cost of the incumbent platform have more significant effects on the evolutionary process of double-round monopoly. Therefore, it is suggested that government regulators should focus on the cross-border magnitude of super platforms to safeguard the rights and interests of incumbent platforms and startup platforms in order to allow for fair competition. At the same time, they should also adjust the regulation intensity by the evolution of double-round monopoly in the market, in order to realize real-time dynamic regulation with the mutual coordination of multiple entities.

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Section: Research On the Concept And Evolutionary Motivation Of Doubl...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on the Evolutionary Mechanism of Double-Round Monopoly of Super Platforms in China—Based on Four-Party Evolutionary Game

Ma,

Zhang,

Guo

et al. 2023

Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Leading digital platforms should be conceived as planning actors whose objective is to extend their control over other actors involved in their production and innovation network [13]. If a platform tends to become a market leader, or one of the oligopolies, to a large extent, its core business needs to become one of the essential infrastructures for people's lives.…”

Section: Limited Core Businessmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Analysis of the Development Dilemma of Baidu Tieba from the Perspective of Platform Capitalism

Deng

2023

AEMPS

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Baidu Tieba has become one of the favorite online entertainment sites for many Internet citizens over the last decade. However, it faces obvious development difficulties nowadays. The business model of platform capitalism is mainstream in some platform firms, which is more competitive in the market. This study hopes to use the business model of platform capitalism to find out the reason for the development dilemma of Baidu Tieba. Meanwhile, it can illustrate the relationship between platform capitalism and platform firms. The paper will analyze Baidu Tieba as a network platform product in detail and compare it with other platform companies dominant in the market. In conclusion, there are three significant factors leading to the decline of Baidu Tieba: Firstly, the advertising model of Baidu Tieba impedes user interaction and imposes labor exploitation on users. Secondly, the social function of Baidu Tieba is separated from offline social life, so Baidu Tieba fails to benefit from the network effect. Lastly, the core business of Baidu Tieba is limited, lacking the monopolistic tendency to expand and gain a superior position in the market.

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“…However, the narrowing of AI research suggests that the offer of such potential close substitutes is also declining, which would indeed lead to a concentration of the market as a whole. Indeed, the tendency of digital technologies to lead to superstar firms that dominate their market with knock-on effects on both down- and upstream market power is increasingly well documented (Coveri et al, 2021 ; Rikap, 2021 ).…”

Section: Understanding the Mechanisms Of The Trilemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

The AI trilemma: Saving the planet without ruining our jobs

Ernst

2022

Front. Artif. Intell.

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Digitalization and artificial intelligence increasingly affect the world of work. Rising risk of massive job losses have sparked technological fears. Limited income and productivity gains concentrated among a few tech companies are fueling inequalities. In addition, the increasing ecological footprint of digital technologies has become the focus of much discussion. This creates a trilemma of rising inequality, low productivity growth and high ecological costs brought by technological progress. How can this trilemma be resolved? Which digital applications should be promoted specifically? And what should policymakers do to address this trilemma? This contribution shows that policymakers should create suitable conditions to fully exploit the potential in the area of network applications (transport, information exchange, supply, provisioning) in order to reap maximum societal benefits that can be widely shared. This requires shifting incentives away from current uses toward those that can, at least partially, address the trilemma. The contribution analyses the scope and limits of current policy instruments in this regard and discusses alternative approaches that are more aligned with the properties of the emerging technological paradigm underlying the digital economy. In particular, it discusses the possibility of institutional innovations required to address the socio-economic challenges resulting from the technological innovations brought about by artificial intelligence.

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Monopoly Capital in the time of digital platforms: a radical approach to the Amazon case

Cited by 17 publications

References 65 publications

Study on the Evolutionary Mechanism of Double-Round Monopoly of Super Platforms in China—Based on Four-Party Evolutionary Game

Study on the Evolutionary Mechanism of Double-Round Monopoly of Super Platforms in China—Based on Four-Party Evolutionary Game

An Analysis of the Development Dilemma of Baidu Tieba from the Perspective of Platform Capitalism

The AI trilemma: Saving the planet without ruining our jobs

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