Mood As Cumulative Expectation Mismatch: A Test of Theory Based on Data from Non-verbal Cognitive Bias Tests

Abstract

Affective states are known to influence behavior and cognitive processes. To assess mood (moderately long-term affective states), the cognitive judgment bias test was developed and has been widely used in various animal species. However, little is known about how mood changes, how mood can be experimentally manipulated, and how mood then feeds back into cognitive judgment. A recent theory argues that mood reflects the cumulative impact of differences between obtained outcomes and expectations. Here expectations refer to an established context. Situations in which an established context fails to match an outcome are then perceived as mismatches of expectation and outcome. We take advantage of the large number of studies published on non-verbal cognitive bias tests in recent years (95 studies with a total of 162 independent tests) to test whether cumulative mismatch could indeed have led to the observed mood changes. Based on a criteria list, we assessed whether mismatch had occurred with the experimental procedure used to induce mood (mood induction mismatch), or in the context of the non-verbal cognitive bias procedure (testing mismatch). For the mood induction mismatch, we scored the mismatch between the subjects’ potential expectations and the manipulations conducted for inducing mood whereas, for the testing mismatch, we scored mismatches that may have occurred during the actual testing. We then investigated whether these two types of mismatch can predict the actual outcome of the cognitive bias study. The present evaluation shows that mood induction mismatch cannot well predict the success of a cognitive bias test. On the other hand, testing mismatch can modulate or even inverse the expected outcome. We think, cognitive bias studies should more specifically aim at creating expectation mismatch while inducing mood states to test the cumulative mismatch theory more properly. Furthermore, testing mismatch should be avoided as much as possible because it can reverse the affective state of animals as measured in a cognitive judgment bias paradigm.

Toward a Standardized Test of Fearful Temperament in Primates: A Sensitive Alternative to the Human Intruder Task for Laboratory-Housed Rhesus Macaques (Macaca mulatta)

“…Additional factors that may have influenced performance on the touch-screen task include mismatching effects (e.g., touch a negative stimulus to gain a positive reward, which has been shown to exacerbate the impact of transient emotion states on task performance (Raoult et al, 2017), and influence of attentional processes (Bar-Haim et al, 2007). For example, Aylward et al (2017) found faster responses by human participants taking part in a computer task to fearful faces compared to happy faces, which was independent of affective state (threat of electric shock).…”

Factors Influencing Individual Variation in Farm Animal Cognition and How to Account for These Statistically

“…Eldar et al ( 159 ) proposed the theory that mood is the cumulative result of differences in expectations and the obtained outcomes of recent experiences. Raoult et al ( 151 ) did not find strong evidence for this theory in their review of 95 papers on cognitive bias and manipulations used to affect mood. However, further research is required with more precise and overt tests of the predictions from this theory, as the studies reviewed did not have the original aim of testing Eldar's theory.…”

“…Emotions are short-lived mental states that arise in response to rewarding or punishing stimuli ( 150 ). Emotions change rapidly and contribute to within individual variability in test performance ( 151 ). Moods, on the other hand, are longer-term mental states that are not tied to a specific stimulus and are thought to be the result of the accumulation of affective experiences in the mid- to longer-term past ( 152 , 153 ).…”

Cognitive Bias in Zoo Animals: An Optimistic Outlook for Welfare Assessment

“…To link judgement bias to welfare, the most common approach is for investigators to expose subjects to an emotion-inducing condition, such as barren versus enriched housing, using a within- or between-subjects design [ 13 , 21 ]. A more recent but less common approach is based on the assertion that individual differences in personality and mood might significantly affect cognitive bias [ 12 , 38 , 39 ]: instead of inducing a purported “good” or “poor” welfare situation on subjects, their cognitive biases have been linked to differences in personality [ 40 , 41 ], spontaneous behavior linked to affective state [ 14 , 42 , 43 ], and possibly moods induced by the tests themselves [ 44 ]. Other, less fundamental methodological variables include the nature of the reinforcement/punishment, how the subjects are conditioned to the cues, the criteria needed to pass to the testing phase, the conditions the subject faces during testing (e.g., socially isolated or not), and the total number of trials (see [ 13 ] (pp.…”