Oxford Handbooks Online 2013
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199730018.013.0021
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Moods, Emotions, and Evaluations as Information

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Cited by 24 publications
(42 citation statements)
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“…These results suggest that state positive emotion played (at least a small) role in trained raters' classroom quality assessments, despite receiving reliability training and reporting their emotions prior to each rating, behaviors which can reduce emotion-influenced judgments (Englich & Soder, 2009;McFarland et al, 2003). This effect is consistent with the literature that shows positive emotions favorably bias high-inference social judgments (Forgas, 2014;Isbell & Lair, 2013). No evidence for a negative emotion bias emerged.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 83%
“…These results suggest that state positive emotion played (at least a small) role in trained raters' classroom quality assessments, despite receiving reliability training and reporting their emotions prior to each rating, behaviors which can reduce emotion-influenced judgments (Englich & Soder, 2009;McFarland et al, 2003). This effect is consistent with the literature that shows positive emotions favorably bias high-inference social judgments (Forgas, 2014;Isbell & Lair, 2013). No evidence for a negative emotion bias emerged.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 83%
“…One could speculate that having participants’ attention drawn to the details of their affective state may have led participants to discount the informational value of their affective cues, which may have altered the effects of mood on processing in the impression formation task. Although a key tenet of the affect-as-information model does maintain that affective cues are relied on only if they are perceived as relevant feedback about whatever is currently in one’s focus of attention, such discounting manipulations routinely eliminate processing differences (e.g., Beukeboom & Semin, 2006; Gasper, 2004; Hirt, Levine, McDonald, Melton, & Martin, 1997; Isbell et al, 2011; Sinclair, Mark, & Clore, 1994; see Isbell & Lair, in press; Schwarz & Clore, 2007, for reviews). For example, Sinclair et al (1994) found that the typical effects of mood on persuasion are eliminated when individuals are led to attribute their feelings to a source-irrelevant cause (i.e., the weather).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Though the information conveyed by affect about accessible thoughts and responses may be experienced in different ways, in each case, it should adjust whether people rely on such thoughts and responses. In effect, positive affect serves as a green light, or a “go signal”, that validates and facilitates the use of accessible mental content and processing styles, whereas most negative affect serves as a red light, or a “stop signal”, that invalidates and inhibits the use of such content and processing styles (e.g., Clore & Huntsinger, , ; Clore et al, ; Isbell & Lair, ; Isbell et al, ; Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, ; Wyer, Clore, & Isbell, ).…”
Section: An Affect‐as‐cognitive‐feedback Accountmentioning
confidence: 99%