Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms

Littlejohn, Clayton

doi:10.1080/00048400902941240

Cited by 17 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…This is different from the claim that there's a contradiction in holding a Moorean absurd belief. See, for example, Williams (1994), Littlejohn (2010). Compare de Almeida (2001).…”

Section: More Moorean Propositionsmentioning

confidence: 97%

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The Norms of Assertion

McKinnon

2015

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“…This is different from the claim that there's a contradiction in holding a Moorean absurd belief. See, for example, Williams (1994), Littlejohn (2010). Compare de Almeida (2001).…”

Section: More Moorean Propositionsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Littlejohn (2010), p. 22. 45 Littlejohn (2010, p. 97.10.1057/9781137521729 -The Norms of Assertion, Rachel McKinnonCopyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com -licensed to University of Alberta -PalgraveConnect -2015-08-03…”

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confidence: 94%

The Norms of Assertion

McKinnon

2015

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“…Hence, if she aims to believe the truth, believing a falsehood is incorrect, given that aim (cf. Littlejohn, 2010, p. 80).…”

Section: Setting the Standardmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 2 For endorsements of (L ib ) or some version of it, see Boghossian, 2008, p. 101; Engel, 2002, p. 57; Humberstone, 1992; Littlejohn, 2010; Lynch, 2004, p. 499; Millar, 2004, p. 43, 2009, p. 140; Platts, 1997, p. 256; Railton, 1994; Shah, 2003, p. 459; Shah and Velleman, 2005, pp. 498–499; Steglich‐Petersen, 2006, 2009; Wedgwood, 2002, p. 267; Wiggins, 1998, p. 148; Williams, 1973, p. 136; Zagzebski, 2003, pp.…”

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confidence: 99%

Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth?

Whiting

2012

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief's aim using the notion of truth. In this paper, by considering whether they can account for belief's standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief's aim given in terms of truth and advance a neglected alternative.It should not be imagined that there is much to endure in the search after truth.

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“…26 Adler (2002) and Huemer (2007) appeal to this claim about knowledge and the aim of belief in their discussion of Moore's Paradox. (For critical discussion of these arguments, see Littlejohn (2010).) Smithies (2011) agrees that there is this normative connection between belief and knowledge, but does not seem to think that it can do the explanatory work that these authors suggest.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Note Concerning Justification and Access

Littlejohn¹

2013

Episteme

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Certain combinations of attitudes are manifestly unreasonable. It is unreasonable to believe that dogs bark, for example, if one concedes that one has no justification to believe this. Why are the irrational combinations irrational? One suggestion is that these are attitudes that a subject cannot have justification to have. If this is right, we can test claims about the structure of propositional justification by relying on our observations about which combinations of attitudes constitute Moorean absurd pairs. In a recent defense of access internalism, Smithies argues that only access internalism can explain why various combinations of attitude are irrational. In this paper, I shall argue that access internalism cannot explain the relevant data. Reflection on Moore's Paradox will not tell us much of anything about propositional justification and cannot support access internalism.

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Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms

Cited by 17 publications

References 32 publications

The Norms of Assertion

The Norms of Assertion

Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth?

A Note Concerning Justification and Access

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