Moral Action as Cheater Suppression in Human Superorganisms

Abstract

For it is peculiar to man as compared to the other animals that he alone has a perception of good and bad and just and unjust and other things [of Developments in human technology and social organization have enabled the kinds of social roles that individuals can undertake to proliferate-creating a degree of interdependence not seen in other species. Human societies cannot rely on shared genetic interests or dyadic reciprocity to ensure social cohesion because genetic similarity is low while indirect reciprocity is rife; nevertheless, such societies cohere, due to the evolution of novel regulatory mechanisms that inhibit defaulting on social obligations: moral sentiments and actions. While the degree of social cooperation created by these mechanisms remains less than that of the eusocial insects, it is sufficient to suggest that contemporary human societies constitute crude "superorganisms" to which their members have wide-ranging responsibilities. The present paper argues that the domains and extent of moral regulation can be most usefully identified by defining the set of functions required to sustain a human superorganism. These functions are shown to be boundary, production, distribution, storage, control, structure, enforcement, signaling, memory, excretion, perception, and reproduction. Moral obligations to act then arise when individuals default on contributing to these functions. Major evolutionary transition theory is used to justify claims as to the crucial aspects of superorganism functioning, which enabled human superorganismal groups to form, and thus what aspects of morality had to be developed since the time of our common ancestor with other primates. Finally, comparison is made to Moral Foundations Theory, and the Model of Moral Motives and Dyadic Morality approaches, which suggests that Human Superorganism Theory is simultaneously more parsimonious while being more broadly explanatory. We believe this new approach to defining the moral domain has implications for fields ranging from psychology to legal theory.

Synthesizing Proximate and Distal Levels of Explanation: Toward an Evolution-Informed Sociology

“…Similarly, former President of the ASA Massey (2002, p. 1) called for a deeper examination of "the biological foundations upon which our behavior ultimately rests." Withholding some notable exceptions (e.g., van den Berghe, 1975van den Berghe, , 1990Ellis, 1977Ellis, , 1995Ellis, , 1996Lopreato and Crippen, 1999;Horne, 2004;Hopcroft, 2005Hopcroft, , 2016aHuber, 2007;Turner et al, 2015;Hopcroft and Martin, 2016;Marshall, 2016;Mazur, 2016;Niedenzu et al, 2016;Walsh and Yun, 2016;Aunger, 2017;Daly and Perry, 2017;Montagu, 2017), we echo Lizardo and Massey's concern that the discipline has remained steadfast in its rejection of biological explanatory factors (see Ellis, 1995;Lizardo, 2014;Walsh and Yun, 2016).…”

What is the noosphere? Planetary superorganism, major evolutionary transition and emergence

“…Robert Aunger (2017) also used LST to argue that the key role of morality is to regulate the human superorganism . Authors reflecting on human superorganism unfortunately often suggest embarrassing implications; for example, Aunger (2017, p. 8a) writes that superorganism theory ‘thus suggests that it is legitimate to injure or take the life of others if they are outsiders (especially in the context of inter‐group conflict)’, while Gregory Stock (1993, p. 209) who popularized the idea of a growing global superorganism suggested as an almost inevitability a bioweapon to control fertility: ‘When birth‐control vaccines are developed for humans, there is the obvious possibility that some contagious, flu‐like infection might be created and released, rendering large numbers of people less able to conceive children.’ These two examples are shocking because they question inalienable rights, respectively, to live and to procreate. The mistake is to apply this organic analogy too quickly, normatively and uncritically.…”

“…Another example of the criticality of defining the boundary can be illustrated by the thorough examination of morality from an evolutionary and human superorganism point of view, as proposed by Aunger (2017). The boundary here is also on humanity , so implicitly what is ‘good’ is to develop humanity, not necessarily to take care of the broader environment that becomes the geosphere, the biosphere or the technosphere.…”

Is our planet doubly alive? Gaia, globalization, and the Anthropocene’s planetary superorganisms

“…Biologists have also begun presenting superorganicist interpretations of higher scales of life, ranging from the eusocial colonies of insects and mole rats to human social groups (Aunger, 2017;Boomsma and Gawne, 2018;Coplan et al, 2017;Gardner and Grafen, 2009;O'Shea-Wheller et al, 2015;Wilson, 2007Wilson, , 2020Wilson et al, 2008).…”