Moral agency, autonomy, and heteronomy in early Confucian philosophy

Abstract

This paper discusses Confucian notions of moral autonomy and moral agency that do not follow strict and ideal notions of autonomy that one can find in many Western theories of moral philosophy. In Kantian deontology, for example, one's autonomy, specifically one's rational will to follow universal moral rules, is a necessary condition of moral agency and moral responsibility. In Confucian moral philosophy, however, this type of strict moral autonomy is rarely observed. A Confucian moral agent is often depicted as a partially heteronomous individual who often accepts and follows others' moral authority and considers external contingencies in her moral deliberations. Yet active moral agency is maintained in Confucian philosophy. In this paper, I will explain and analyze a partially heteronomous but active form of moral agency in Confucian moral philosophy. First, I will survey different notions of moral autonomy and explore philosophical theories of partial autonomy and heteronomy. Second, I will discuss, on the basis of interactive, responsive, and situated notions of the self, how Confucian moral agency can be explained without strict standards of autonomy. In Confucianism, morality or virtuosity reflects the relational, responsive, and situated nature of human being that resonates with other human beings and their environmental contingencies. Mencius, for example, acknowledges and discusses interactive or relational nature of moral action and the dependency of the moral self on external conditions of life without giving up active moral effort and full moral responsibility. Third, based on my analysis of moral autonomy and responsibility in early Confucian philosophy, I will argue that Confucian moral philosophy provides a unique way of understanding moral agency, not through selfenclosed independency but through relational and interactive interdependency of communal agency. ---

Relational privacy: Where the East and the West could meet

“…For example, a detailed study of the relational self under feminist theory and Confucian role ethics could bring more clarity to the concept of relational autonomy and how it might be used to interpret privacy, and could inspire more discussions in intercultural information ethics (Capurro, ). For example, it was suggested that the relationality of the Confucian self, however, is not fully explained by the feminist viewpoint …” Confucian agents are not just social beings but also broadly conceived cosmic beings (or “becomings”) (Seok, , p. 6). In closing, this paper is mindful of Capurro ()’s proposition that “intercultural information ethics needs more work, as comparing apparently similar or dissimilar concepts that were coined in different historical and cultural settings is dangerous in at least two ways.…”

“…Seok () wrote that the difference in understanding the relation of emotion and morality can be one of the reasons that explain the divergence in the conception of t he person in the East and West. Seok () leveraged the concept of moral agency to understand the different conceptions of person and recognized that the Western conception of the person under Kantian philosophy considers the person with self‐enclosed independency . The very opposite of Kantian person is heteronomy which sees agency as entirely up to external contingencies.…”

“…The very opposite of Kantian person is heteronomy which sees agency as entirely up to external contingencies. However, between these two extremes of the self‐governing and other governing (p. 2) is what might correspond to the concept of a relational person, which Seok () termed as communal agency . Communal agency is individual agency in recognition of the influence of social context, and “moral inclinations and other‐regarding emotions are the essential foundations of virtue” under Confucianism (Seok, , p. 4).…”

Ethos in Early Chinese Rhetoric: The Case of “Heaven”

“…Admittedly, early Confucianism does speak of moral agency, but it is not so much of selfhood in an individual as of "human nature" in general terms (Van Norden 2000). According to Seok, an "active form of moral agency" can still be observed in Confucian discourse, but it is not based on "self-enclosed independency" but rather on "relational and interactive interdependency of communal agency" (Seok 2017). In short, human agency, in the form of asserting an autonomous individual self, is out of the picture in the Confucian tradition, which values and puts to use the performative function of language while at the same time advocating self-cultivation, self-restraint, and self-effacement as virtues that a jun-zi (i.e., a nobleman or gentleman in the spiritual sense) must possess.…”

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“…Scholars of Chinese philosophy have often noted the relational quality of the self. See, among many others, Ames (, , ); Li (); Kuriyama (); Lai (, ); Yuan (); Brindley (); Wang (); Ramsey (); Seok (). These scholars reflect on the tension between the relational self and notions such as autonomy and moral responsibility.…”