Moral Cognition and the Law and Ethics of Armed Conflict

Abstract

In contemporary political science, many believe that normative restrictions on armed conflict are an outgrowth of Western culture and the just war tradition. Drawing on historical evidence, which shows that political actors in Ancient China and the early Islamic empire endorsed civilian protection rules, I claim that such norms are more common than most International Relations (IR) theorists suppose. For IR theory, this raises an important puzzle: How can we explain why similar normative ideas emerged in human societies that are otherwise very different? Building on research in cognitive science, social psychology, and social neuroscience, I argue that most people have natural cognitive and emotional predispositions that bias the emergence and transmission of cultural norms that protect non‐combatants. More specifically, capacities for perspective‐taking and empathy shape how people interpret the limits of their moral commitments, and when these capacities are engaged, intuitional heuristics affect how they judge the morality of killing in war. What is more, I claim that three key contextual variables moderate the connection between innate moral intuitions and the development of civilian protection norms: (i) societal interdependence, (ii) the social empowerment of marginal actors, and (iii) the creation of norms in argumentative contexts that require impartial moral reasoning. I argue that rationalist and constructivist theories of norm emergence will be able to better explain the emergence, the durability, and the institutional design of the norms of war by incorporating this naturalistic theory of moral cognition.

The principle of discrimination: Investigating perceptions of soldiers

“…As well as being codified in international laws of war (Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I, Articles 48, 51), this principle ranks first among philosophical prescriptions for how wars should be fought (Orend, 2005;Moseley, 2015). In common parlance, it may be better known as "civilian immunity," and throughout world historyfrom contemporary laws of armed conflict, to ancient China and early Islamhumanitarian limits on war have included some version of this principle (French, 2016;Traven, 2013Traven, , 2015. Despite widespread in-principle agreement with the principle of discrimination (see Gade, 2010, for a review), applying it to any particular act of killing in war is difficultboth for soldiers using the principle to guide their actions (e.g., Graves, 1929Graves, /2000Klay, 2014), and for third-party judges, evaluating the conduct of war after the fact (e.g., Apuzzo, 2014;BBC, 2013BBC, , 2017McMahan, 2010;McVeigh, 2017).…”

The Morality of War: A Review and Research Agenda

“…The principle of discrimination is not a recent invention. Warrior codes of ethics and humanitarian limits on conflict appear to have included -throughout history -some version of the principle of discrimination, in that there are some categories of people who are considered more legitimate targets of attack than others (French, 2005;Traven, 2015). The prescriptive philosophical, legal, and historical literature thus suggests that the principle of discrimination will be an important part of a descriptive morality of war as well.…”

Inferring Intentions from Consequences: How Moral Judgments Shape Citizen Perceptions of Wartime Conduct

“…Many people believe that intended harms are a deeper moral problem than incidental harms (Traven 2015). This view is not only reflected in just war doctrine but also forms a key part of International Humanitarian Law.…”