Moral Conviction

Abstract

We often praise people who stand by their convictions in the face of adversity and practice what they preach. However, strong moral convictions can also motivate atrocious acts. Two significant questions here are (1) whether conviction itself -taken as a mode of beliefhas any distinctive value, or whether all the value of conviction derives from its substantive content, and (2) how conviction can be made responsible in a way that mitigates the risks of falling into dogmatism, fanaticism, and other vices. In response to the first question, I suggest that conviction has instrumental value that derives from its relationship to integrity and courage. On the second question, I articulate the roles that reflection, discourse (engagement with others), and humility must play in the dialectical process of maintaining responsible convictions.'People in those old times had convictions; we moderns have only opinions. And it needs more than a mere opinion to erect a Gothic cathedral.' -Heinrich Heine, The French Stage (1837) 1.If Heinrich Heine is correct, then a world in which people have 'only opinions' is a world in which nothing great can be achieved. We often praise people of integrity, who honour their convictions in the face of adversity and practice what they preach.We admire people who have the courage to take a stand. Of course, this praise must surely also be based upon respect for, if not approval of, that for which such people stand. The conviction of suicide bombers, for example, is surely as much a factor in our condemnation as are the horrific consequences of their actions. Given a long historical catalogue (as well as contemporary instances) of catastrophic, vicious, and insane convictions, is there anything about moral conviction qua moral conviction which, at least sometimes, makes it valuable? It might seem that all the value can be located in the content of one's convictions. If that's right, then there is nothing 'value-added' in belief with conviction. Since convictions qua convictions can be good or bad, that any particular moral belief attains the status of a conviction might simply be, at best, a point of moral indifference.A more severe view on conviction would hold that moral convictions are a bad thing to have -that there is something irrational about elevating any moral belief (however respectable) to the status of a conviction. In doing so, one risks succumbing to vices of moral blindness: fanaticism, dogmatism and self-righteousness (or what Bernard Gert has recently called moral arrogance). 1 Nietzsche warned, 'Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies.' 2 Convictions can blind us. Thus, it might be thought, better not to have them.I will argue -against both ambivalence toward and outright dismissal of moral conviction -that moral conviction has instrumental value because of the shaping and motivational roles it plays within the individual. However, the value of conviction, from the epistemic perspective, must also depend upon its being responsible. The latter half of this essa...

Conscientious Objections to Corporate Wrongdoing

“…Relativity is not problematic in and of itself. A major problem arises, however, when conscience is unreflective, that is, dogmatic or doctrinaire (Pianalto ). Conscience guided by unreason has driven true believers to excess.…”