Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics

McConnell, Terrance C.

doi:10.1080/00455091.1978.10717051

Cited by 53 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…As was observed by McConnell (1978), an agent who asks for moral advice is not satisfied by being told to do both of two incompatible things. Her request for advice can be seen as a request for a shift to an action-guiding perspective.…”

Section: Pragmatic Resolutions Of Intractable Dilemmasmentioning

confidence: 73%

But what should I do?

Hansson

1999

Philosophia

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Section: Pragmatic Resolutions Of Intractable Dilemmasmentioning

confidence: 73%

But what should I do?

Hansson

1999

Philosophia

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“…But they describe Sophie's feelings differently. Their point of departure is the observation that what Sophie feels is regret (McConnell ). No doubt, they add, we would be troubled if Sophie did not regret what happened.…”

Section: Sophie's Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas

Szigeti

2015

Dialectica

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It is sometimes said that certain hard moral choices constitute tragic moral dilemmas in which no available course of action is justifiable, and so the agent is blameworthy whatever she chooses. This paper criticizes a certain approach to the debate about moral dilemmas and considers the metaethical implications of the criticisms. The approach in question has been taken by many advocates as well as opponents of moral dilemmas who believe that analyzing the emotional response of the agent is the key to the debate about moral dilemmas. The metaethical position this approach is most naturally associated with is sentimentalism. Sentimentalists claim that evaluation, and in particular moral evaluation, crucially depends on human sentiment. This paper is not concerned with the question whether moral dilemmas exist, but rather with emotion-based arguments used on both sides of the debate. The first aim of the paper is to show that emotion-based arguments by friends or foes of moral dilemmas cannot garner support from sentimentalism. The second aim is to show that this constitutes a serious problem for sentimentalism.

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“…6 The locus of the dispute is the widely accepted moral axiom that ought implies can. If this is the case, then it is not possible to have two conflicting obligations where only one can be satisfied.…”

Section: The Mutuality Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

Principlism and moral dilemmas: a new principle

2005

J Med Ethics

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Moral conflicts occur in theories that involve more than one principle. I examine basic ways of dealing with moral dilemmas in medical ethics and in ethics generally, and propose a different approach based on a principle I call the “mutuality principle”. It is offered as an addition to Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’ principlism. The principle calls for the mutual enhancement of basic moral values. After explaining the principle and its strengths, I test it by way of an examination of three responses—in the recentFestschriftfor Dr Raanon Gillon—to a case involving parental refusal of a blood transfusion. The strongest response is the one that comes closest to the requirements of the mutuality principle but yet falls short. I argue that the mutuality principle provides an explicit future orientation in principlism and gives it greater moral coherence.

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Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics

Cited by 53 publications

References 9 publications

But what should I do?

But what should I do?

Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas

Principlism and moral dilemmas: a new principle

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