Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics

Abstract

When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.

Disagreement Lost and Found

“…Recall the experimental findings of a statistically significant resistance in ordinary subjects toward the use of markers like 'incorrect', 'wrong', and 'false' in the context of (clearly and explicitly) fundamental disagreements (Sarkissian et al 2011, Khoo & Knobe 2016. Such a reticence fits well with the QED account of these disagreement, given the observed datum that mere conflicts in attitudes (as in exchange (2)) do not in general license such use.…”

“…So it is suggested that it is actually the absolutist, not the relativist, who has some explaining to do. As Khoo and Knobe (2016) put it, "not only is it not problematic for a theory if it fails to predict exclusionary content in all cases of moral disagreement, but it is problematic for a theory if it does predict exclusionary content in all cases of moral disagreement." 5 I know this claim will raise some eyebrows, 6 so while it isn't my purpose in this paper to argue for the strategy, I'll quickly list some of the kinds of evidence I have in mind:…”

“…This includes at least Robinson 2009, Björnsson & Finlay 2010, Sundell 2011, Wong 2011, Plunkett & Sundell 2013, Khoo & Knobe 2016, Silk ms-a, ms-b, 2016 This is only a rough and preliminary gloss on the metalinguistic approach, and some of the attitudes towards S's doing A, then we can expect them also normally to have conflicting attitudes towards how normative words are used in relation to S's doing A, and vice versa.…”

Subjective Disagreement

“…Other authors have developed Discursive Disagreement in a contextualist framework. For example, some have proposed that Ava and Bert are involved in a metalinguistic dispute about how to set the value of a conversational standard of taste parameter (Plunkett and Sundell ; Barker ; for similar ideas, see DeRose ; Khoo ; Khoo and Knobe ; Silk ). Thus in uttering (3a), Ava proposes to set the standard of taste parameter in such a way that the escargot falls under the extension of tasty .…”

“…And so, some may suggest, we should recast the Discursive Account as a dispositional theory, e.g. : Discursive Account of Speechless Disagreement (Dispositional) Two parties have a speechless disagreement over some subjective matter M iff they are disposed to have a discursive disagreement over M . (See Khoo and Knobe , fn. 21 for a suggestion along these lines.)…”