Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?

Abstract

One of the reasons why moral enhancement may be controversial, is because the advantages of moral enhancement may fall upon society rather than on those who are enhanced. If directed at individuals with certain counter-moral traits it may have direct societal benefits by lowering immoral behavior and increasing public safety, but it is not directly clear if this also benefits the individual in question. In this paper, we will discuss what we consider to be moral enhancement, how different means may be used to achieve it and whether the means we employ to reach moral enhancement matter morally. Are certain means to achieve moral enhancement wrong in themselves? Are certain means to achieve moral enhancement better than others, and if so, why? More specifically, we will investigate whether the difference between direct and indirect moral enhancement matters morally. Is it the case that indirect means are morally preferable to direct means of moral enhancement and can we indeed pinpoint relevant intrinsic, moral differences between both? We argue that the distinction between direct and indirect means is indeed morally relevant, but only insofar as it tracks an underlying distinction between active and passive interventions. Although passive interventions can be ethical provided specific safeguards are put in place, these interventions exhibit a greater potential to compromise autonomy and disrupt identity.

Forensic practitioners’ expectations and moral views regarding neurobiological interventions in offenders with mental disorders

“…In our view, important differences exist between forcing a biomedical intervention upon an offender and depriving an offender of the right to free movement. Even though current incarceration practices are often ethically problematic, incarceration does not violate an offender's mental liberty in the same way forced neurointerventions can violate it, because biomedical interventions are more likely to bypass our capacity to reflect upon the changes they bring about, and can overrule the ability to gradually endorse, reject, or object to the alterations of our self (Focquaert and Schermer, 2015;Focquaert, 2017).…”

The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics

“…(2015,277) Schaefer argues that individuals should be permitted to "work on" their weakness of will-in order to reduce associated akrasia-but that no one should be forced to undertake such (indirect) moral self-enhancement (with the possible exception of children being brought up by their parents; for a related discussion, see Maslen et al, 2014). Again, this seems uncontroversial: strengthening one's will to act in accordance with one's considered judgments, moral or otherwise, is usually 3 a virtue on any plausible account (see Persson and Savulescu, 2016); the only significant debate in this area, as we have just suggested, has to do with the question of means (see Focquaert and Schermer, 2015). Traditional moral education, including the development and maintenance of good motivations and habits, is the most obvious-and least contentious-possibility.…”

“…More ecologically valid results pertain to the administration of drugs such as methylphenidate or lithium to violent criminals with ADHD or to children with conduct disorder to reduce aggressive behavioral tendencies (see, e.g., Ginsberg et al, 2013Ginsberg et al, , 2015Ipser and Stein, 2007;Margari et al, 2014;Turgay, 2009), as well as antilibidinal agents to reduce sexual desire in convicted sex offenders Lösel and Schumucker, 2005;Thibaut et al, 2010). Such measures remain controversial, however, both ethically (Craig, 2016;Gupta, 2012;Singh, 2008) and conceptually, that is, in terms of their status as moral enhancers as opposed to mere forms of "behavioral control" (see Focquaert and Schermer, 2015;see also McMillan, 2014).…”

The Right to Bodily Integrity and the Rehabilitation of Offenders Through Medical Interventions: A Reply to Thomas Douglas

“…The offender is likely to doubt whether the injection will promote his own welfare. Furthermore, the thought of being forcibly injected with a chemical that alters one's motivations in a way that bypasses ones rational faculties could be particularly distressing [11]. 7 A closer analogy is the example, discussed above, involving the compulsory injection with a mind-altering drug of a mentally ill person who is a danger to herself or others.…”