2011
DOI: 10.1108/09653561111161699
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Moral hazard and adverse selection in Chinese construction tender market

Abstract: Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to understand the root cause of a large number of quality problems in the current Chinese construction market. Design/methodology/approach -Information economics theory is used to analyze the cause of construction quality problems related to the specific case of the Wenchuan earthquake of China. Findings -The single low price competition in the construction tender market leads to the serious adverse selection and moral hazard behavior of bidding firms. The main solution to… Show more

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Cited by 19 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…To explore the impact of asymmetry in terrorist's attributes between government and terrorist on defense equilibrium, Nikoofal and Zhuang built a game model that the government chooses between disclosure and secrecy of her defense system [12]. To well understand the quality problems in the construction market in China, Liu et al proposed a principle-agent model to investigate construction project bidding and the root causes of the potential risks in the process of postearthquake reconstruction [13]. Besides, much more existing literature revealed the relationships among stakeholders in the research of different types of risk management, such as anti-terrorist [14,15] and environmental risk control [16].…”
Section: Mcmillan Et Al Proposed a Game-theoretic Model To Analyzementioning
confidence: 99%
“…To explore the impact of asymmetry in terrorist's attributes between government and terrorist on defense equilibrium, Nikoofal and Zhuang built a game model that the government chooses between disclosure and secrecy of her defense system [12]. To well understand the quality problems in the construction market in China, Liu et al proposed a principle-agent model to investigate construction project bidding and the root causes of the potential risks in the process of postearthquake reconstruction [13]. Besides, much more existing literature revealed the relationships among stakeholders in the research of different types of risk management, such as anti-terrorist [14,15] and environmental risk control [16].…”
Section: Mcmillan Et Al Proposed a Game-theoretic Model To Analyzementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Factors that leading to the occupational ethics risk of technical transaction are closely related to the characteristics of the field, for example, seek quick success and instant benefits [35,36], opportunistic psychology [18,30,31,37], asymmetry of information [28,31], poor supervision and punishment [38][39][40], poor absorption capacity of the technology importer [41], great difference in cooperation objectives and expectations of the parties [33,42], poor technical competition intelligence capacity of enterprises [43,44], high uncertainty in technology research and development [3,45], fierce market competition [14,39,46], high cost of know-how [1,22,27], and unreasonable incentive mechanism of technology transaction [47,48].…”
Section: Factors Leading To Occupational Ethics Risk In Technology Trmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As with many developing nations, the construction industry consumes a large amount of resources and energy, generally involving poor working conditions, frequent conflicts, and significantly negative impacts on the environment (Fenn et al 1997;Lu and Tam 2013;Shen and Tam 2002). There are also more than million immigrant construction workers in China, many of whom are not paid on time (CBS 2013); this, along with China's other structural problems and below-standard worker safety, has also contributed to a large number of casualties in the construction industry (Liu et al 2011). The prevalence of corruption and collusive bidding are also another two well-known problems (Xiao 2014).…”
Section: The Situation In Chinamentioning
confidence: 99%