Moral Hazard in Property Tax Administration: A Comparative Analysis of the Czech and Slovak Republics

Bryson, Phillip J.; Cornia, Gary C.

doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100003

Cited by 8 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 13 publications

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“…14. See, for example, Bahl, Martinez-Vasquez, and Youngman (2008); Bird andSlack (2004, 2006); Connolly and Bell (2009); Hale (1985); Jibao and Prichard (2016); McCluskey, Cornia, and Walters (2013); National Institute of Urban Affairs (2010); Norregaard (2013); Orton (2005); Phillip and Gary (2003); Rao (2013); von Haldenwang (2015); Yun Casalilla and O'Brien (2012). 15.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revenue-Maximising or Revenue-Sacrificing Government? Property Tax in Pakistan

Piracha¹,

Moore

2016

The Journal of Development Studies

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The idea that states seek to maximise their revenue collection has occupied a significant place in contemporary political economy analysis of taxation, and has helped us understand the history of state formation. It is, however, very much at variance with the daily experience of tax policy and practice. Governments are frequently revenue-sacrificers: they fail to use the functioning, legitimate tax collection systems they have available to actually collect much revenue. This paper details the case of property tax collection in Pakistan, and concludes that governments tend to maximise rule before they maximise revenue. The consistent failure of governments to behave in a revenue-hungry fashion needs explanation.

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