Moral judgments, gender, and antisocial preferences: an experimental study

Abstract

We study questionnaire responses to situations in which sacrificing one life may save many other lives. We demonstrate gender differences in moral judgments: males are more supportive of the sacrifice than females. We investigate a source of the endorsement of the sacrifice: antisocial preferences. First, we measure individual proneness to spiteful behavior, using an experimental game with monetary stakes. We demonstrate that spitefulness can be sizable-a fifth of our participants behave spitefully-but it is not associated with gender. Second, we find that gender is consistently associated with responses even when we account for individual differences in the propensity to spitefulness.

Using Ethical Dilemmas to Predict Antisocial Choices with Real Payoff Consequences: An Experimental Study

“…Regarding the determinants of money burning, we find evidence that inequality version is present, but nastiness is also observed because some individuals burn a counterpart's money even when already at a payoff advantage. We also report that utilitarian behavior in the Trolley dilemma is not linked to antisocial money burning, which contrasts with previous conclusions in the literature suggesting that antisocial types are more utilitarian ( Koenigs et al, 2007;Bartels and Pizarro, 2011;Gao and Tang, 2013;Bracht and Zylbersztejn, 2018 ). However, those making ethically dubious choices in the Trolley problem are also more antisocial in their money burning choices.…”

Using ethical dilemmas to predict antisocial choices with real payoff consequences: An experimental study

“…This result is somewhat related to the gender result found inBracht and Zylbersztejn (2017), who find males more likely to take action in a set of moral dilemmas. The study includes a variety of dilemmas in addition to a limited number of Trolley dilemmas, but they do not distinguish dilemmas in their set that involve a direct versus indirect action in the moral choice.…”

“…Some authors have recently argued that hypothetical ethical dilemmas are not useful for predicting behaviour in real dilemmas (Bostyn et al, 2018). 3 Other studies suggest that antisocial personality types may be more willing to make a difficult moral choice that produces a utilitarian outcome (Koenigs et al, 2007;Bartels and Pizarro, 2011;Bracht and Zylbersztejn, 2017). 4 In this paper we attempt to contribute to this existing literature that attempts to explore the connection between some version of antisocial behavior and choice in hypothetical moral dilemma.…”

“…Bostyn et al (2018) examine whether Trolley dilemma responses predict propensity to deliver electric shocks to mice in dilemmas with similar but nonfatal scenarios.4 Using self-report measure of antisocial personality tendencies(Bartels and Pizarro, 2011) or patients with brain damage in regions important to emotion generation(Koenigs et al, 2007), these studies find tendencies towards increased utilitarianism in individuals with antisocial personality. Another recent study(Bracht and Zylbersztejn, (2017) is quite related to ours in that it also examines ethical choice in hypothetical dilemmas as well as in a consequential money transfer game. The differences in our study are notable, however.…”

“…Secondly, both our hypothetical and consequential choice experiments vary the relative efficiency or cost of one's action, thus allowing a more thorough examination of ethical and antisocial choice. Finally, we use a morality measure derived from the Trolley dilemma to predict behavior in the consequential money burning game, whileBracht and Zylbersztejn (2017) use the outcome in their consequential game as a regressor in the ethical dilemma choice. While of potential interest, we find the causation of hypothetical-to-consequential choice more valuable in terms of implications and use as a potential screening or identification mechanism (e.g., job application/interview screener).5 It is therefore important to note that many moral dilemmas confound the utilitarian choice from the choice one might make for non-utilitarian reasons.…”