Moral reasons not to breastfeed: a response to Woollard and Porter

Abstract

Woollard and Porter argue that mothers have no moral duty to breastfeed their babies. Rather, mothers simply have moral reason(s) to breastfeed, stemming from the benefits of breast feeding for babies. According to Woollard and Porter, doing what one has moral reason to do is often supererogatory, not obligatory. I agree that mothers have no moral duty to breastfeed. However, it is misleading to suggest that mothers in general have moral reason to breastfeed and to liken not breastfeeding to not performing some supererogatory action. I will suggest mothers in general have pro tanto, but not all-things-considered, moral reason to breastfeed. Moreover, I suggest many mothers also have pro tanto moral reasons not to breastfeed. Breastfeeding is not always supererogatory; indeed, sometimes not breastfeeding is morally better. This is important because it contradicts dangerous assumptions in public discourse. One way of characterising popular consensus about breastfeeding is as Woollard and Porter do: mothers have a duty to breastfeed. But we might also characterise popular consensus differently: all moral reasons for/against breastfeeding are on the 'pro' breastfeeding side of the issue, whereas if there are any (good) reasons not to breastfeed these are non-moral (prudential). Woollard and Porter's argument is important and correct in concluding that mothers have no duty to breastfeed, but it leaves this other false and dangerous idea intact and even subtly reinforces it.

Feeding Infants: Choice-Specific Considerations, Parental Obligation, and Pragmatic Satisficing

“…The first conflates having a moral reason to do something and having a defeasible duty to do it. There are many things it would be morally good to do, but which are supererogatory, not morally obligatory (though, see Callahan ( 2019b )).…”

“…For instance, one might think that parents should do at least as well as the best available alternative caregiver, but that if all available caregivers would be abusive or neglectful there is an obligation to do better than that (Gheaus 2021 ). Finally, one might hold (as Woollard seems to) a Dual-Interest view, where parents have obligations to benefit their children (some not enforceable by the state), but also entitlements to consider their own interests (Callahan 2019b ).…”

“…Since EBFoD suggests that breastfeeding parents, primarily cis mothers, be free to feed a child in a near-unlimited capacity, this uneven distribution of labour may perpetuate ongoing tensions affecting all members of a household. Per Callahan ( 2019b ), “[b]reastfeeding…constitutes a large portion of parental responsibilities in the early weeks and months of a baby’s life…breastfeeding may inculcate patterns of behaviour in which mothers assume parental responsibilities by default.”…”

“…However, even if alternative caregivers would EBFoD, there are reasons to deny that a Best Custodian approach grounds an obligation to EBFoD. For many parents, the child whose feeding is under consideration is not their only child (Callahan 2019b : 214). Those who advance a Best Custodian view have two options concerning parents with multiple children.…”

“…There are also benefits to infants from a mixed or EFF approach. For instance, a parent who engages in EBFoD will find that doing so can “outstrip the responsibilities even of being a consistent caregiver with whom babies can form a secure attachment” (Callahan 2019b : 214). Thus, focusing on the biomedical benefits of breastfeeding may involve relative neglect of other benefits.…”