Moral Responsibility, Authenticity, and Education

Haji, Ishtiyaque; Cuypers, Stefaan E.

doi:10.4324/9780203895146

Cited by 37 publications

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“…166-172, 183-184. 33 See, e.g., Haji 2009 ;and Haji and Cuypers 2008 . identical to her post-manipulated later self. The fi rst few engineered-in desires of victimized Beth cause her to exercise 14 hours of intellectual muscle on her fi rst day of work following psychosurgery; in brief, Beth A -s. (One may take her A -ing to be her deciding to A if one insists that directly free actions are mental acts of decision-making.…”

Section: Compatibilist Luck An Intractable Concern?mentioning

confidence: 97%

Luck, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism

Haji

2015

Dialogue

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Many have thought that libertarian accounts of free action succumb to a problem about luck. Recently, it has been proposed that compatibilist accounts, which unlike libertarian ones, maintain that free action and determinism are compatible, are also vulnerable to a problem about luck. In this paper, I argue that the problem of compatibilist luck is not novel insofar as it is one manifestation of a more general concern to which compatibilists and libertarians have responded. Furthermore, these responses are not effective responses to the problem of libertarian luck.RÉSUMÉ : Plusieurs ont soutenu par le passé que les descriptions libertariennes de l'action libre achoppent sur le problème de la chance. Il a récemment été proposé que les descriptions compatibilistes, selon lesquelles l'action libre et le déterminisme sont compatibles, sont affaiblies par un problème similaire. Dans cet article, je soutiens que le problème de la chance compatibiliste n'est pas nouveau, dans la mesure où il s'agit d'une manifestation d'une question plus générale à laquelle les compatibilistes et les libertariens ont répondu. En outre, j'avance que ces réponses ne constituent pas des solutions effi caces au problème de la chance envisagé du point de vue libertarien.

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Section: Compatibilist Luck An Intractable Concern?mentioning

confidence: 97%

Luck, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism

Haji

2015

Dialogue

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“…Now, of course, it is one thing to appeal to some authenticity condition that is allegedly necessary for responsibility and quite another to deliver the goods: producing a viable analysis of authenticity. (For such an analysis see Haji and Cuypers 2004;2008. ) Be that as it may, cases such as the Beth/Jones case cast at least a dark shadow, which cannot be ignored, over principle (M).…”

Section: Widerker's Responsementioning

confidence: 97%

Reflections on the Incompatibilist’s Direct Argument

Haji

2007

Erkenn

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The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities -a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could have avoided doing it -to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen's version of the Direct Argument. I then comment on David Widerker's recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.

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“…In the venerable tradition of analyzing the conditions under which the concept of moral responsibility is properly applicable that traces to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (1109b30-35), lack of freedom and ignorance -aspects of the involuntary -can undermine a person's accessibility to moral blame or praise. As I indicated in the introduction, the analysis I favour is the following (Haji, 1998;Haji & Cuypers, 2008). These two widely accepted conditions need supplementation with two others.…”

Section: Encapsulates This View Eloquentlymentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Education and Development

Ruyter¹,

Miedema²

2011

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Moral Responsibility, Authenticity, and Education

Cited by 37 publications

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Luck, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism

Luck, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism

Reflections on the Incompatibilist’s Direct Argument

Moral Education and Development

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