Moral Structure Falls Out of General Event Structure

Strickland, Brent; Fisher, Matthew; Knobe, Joshua

doi:10.1080/1047840x.2012.668272

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…This possibility lends support to the idea that diverse concerns—even if initially separable—are still viewed through a dyadic template (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). This interpretation is consistent with that of researchers who emphasize the importance of domain general moral processes including intention, causation, and coalition building (Cushman & Young, 2011; DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013; Shenhav & Greene, 2010; Strickland et al, 2012).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

“…Dyadic morality, a concept grounded in the cognitive psychology of concepts, suggests that morality is understood through a harm-based template of two perceived minds: a wrongdoing agent ( A ) acting upon a suffering patient ( P ); [ A–P ] (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). This dyadic template combines two dimensions of mind perception—agency and experience (Gray et al, 2007; Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein, & Wegner, 2011)—into a causal structure that grows out of the frequency, universality, and affective power of harm (Davis, 1996; Decety & Cacioppo, 2012; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993), as well as the dyadic nature of language, action, and thought (Brown & Fish, 1983; Strickland, Fisher, & Knobe, 2012). The three components of the dyad—intentional moral agent, causation, and suffering moral patient—are three broad elements highlighted by moral psychology (Hauser, Young, & Cushman, 2007; Mikhail, 2007), psychodynamic theory (Karpman, 1968), the law (Hart & Honoré, 1985), and everyday folk psychology (Guglielmo, Monroe, & Malle, 2009).…”

Section: Moral Dyad and Dyadic Completionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering.

Gray¹,

Schein²,

Ward³

2014

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

251

294

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When something is wrong, someone is harmed. This hypothesis derives from the theory of dyadic morality, which suggests a moral cognitive template of wrongdoing agent and suffering patient (i.e., victim). This dyadic template means that victimless wrongs (e.g., masturbation) are psychologically incomplete, compelling the mind to perceive victims even when they are objectively absent. Five studies reveal that dyadic completion occurs automatically and implicitly: Ostensibly harmless wrongs are perceived to have victims (Study 1), activate concepts of harm (Studies 2 and 3), and increase perceptions of suffering (Studies 4 and 5). These results suggest that perceiving harm in immorality is intuitive and does not require effortful rationalization. This interpretation argues against both standard interpretations of moral dumbfounding and domain-specific theories of morality that assume the psychological existence of harmless wrongs. Dyadic completion also suggests that moral dilemmas in which wrongness (deontology) and harm (utilitarianism) conflict are unrepresentative of typical moral cognition.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

Section: Moral Dyad and Dyadic Completionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering.

Gray¹,

Schein²,

Ward³

2014

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

251

294

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The dyadic structure of harm has been noted historically by philosophers (Aristotle, BC350) and legal scholars (Hart & Honoré, 1985), and reflects the dyadic structure of both action and language (R. Brown & Fish, 1983;Mikhail, 2007;Strickland, Fisher, & Knobe, 2012). Contemporary theories in moral psychology also endorse the dyadic nature of harm, whether in the structure of "ME HURT YOU" (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004), or more complex computations that integrate causality and intentionality (Cushman & Young, 2011;Mikhail, 2007).…”

Section: Harm Is Syntheticmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm

Schein

Gray

2017

Pers Soc Psychol Rev

462

497

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The nature of harm-and therefore moral judgment-may be misunderstood. Rather than an objective matter of reason, we argue that harm should be redefined as an intuitively perceived continuum. This redefinition provides a new understanding of moral content and mechanism-the constructionist Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM). TDM suggests that acts are condemned proportional to three elements: norm violations, negative affect, and-importantly-perceived harm. This harm is dyadic, involving an intentional agent causing damage to a vulnerable patient (A→P). TDM predicts causal links both from harm to immorality (dyadic comparison) and from immorality to harm (dyadic completion). Together, these two processes make the "dyadic loop," explaining moral acquisition and polarization. TDM argues against intuitive harmless wrongs and modular "foundations," but embraces moral pluralism through varieties of values and the flexibility of perceived harm. Dyadic morality impacts understandings of moral character, moral emotion, and political/cultural differences, and provides research guidelines for moral psychology.

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“…The complementary roles of agent and patient stem from the two-dimensional nature of mind perception (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein, & Wegner, 2011) and the general dyadic structure of language (Brown & Fish, 1983) and action (Aristotle, BC 350), in which agents act upon patients (Strickland, Fisher, & Knobe, 2012). The psychological power of a harm-based template stems not only from the presence of intentional harm in many canonical acts of immorality (e.g., murder, rape, assault, and abuse) but also from the affective potency of suffering victims (Blair, 1995), the hypersensitivity of agency detection (Barrett, 2004), the early development of empathy and harm-based concerns (Decety & Meyer, 2008; Govrin, 2014; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007), and the obvious evolutionary importance of harm (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013).…”

Section: Dyadic Moralitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Unifying Moral Dyad

Schein

Gray

2015

Pers Soc Psychol Bull

178

112

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Do moral disagreements regarding specific issues (e.g., patriotism, chastity) reflect deep cognitive differences (i.e., distinct cognitive mechanisms) between liberals and conservatives? Dyadic morality suggests that the answer is "no." Despite moral diversity, we reveal that moral cognition--in both liberals and conservatives--is rooted in a harm-based template. A dyadic template suggests that harm should be central within moral cognition, an idea tested--and confirmed--through six specific hypotheses. Studies suggest that moral judgment occurs via dyadic comparison, in which counter-normative acts are compared with a prototype of harm. Dyadic comparison explains why harm is the most accessible and important of moral content, why harm organizes--and overlaps with--diverse moral content, and why harm best translates across moral content. Dyadic morality suggests that various moral content (e.g., loyalty, purity) are varieties of perceived harm and that past research has substantially exaggerated moral differences between liberals and conservatives.

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Moral Structure Falls Out of General Event Structure

Cited by 9 publications

References 8 publications

The myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering.

The myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering.

The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm

The Unifying Moral Dyad

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