Moral Testimony: A Re-Conceived Understanding Explanation

Moral Assertion

“…For alternative views of moral understanding, see e.g. (Callahan 2018;Hills 2009;Howard 2018;Sliwa 2017). why this is so.…”

The New Puzzle of Moral Deference

“…But we do not usually rely on others for our moral beliefs-even if they are experts and we are not. For example, consider the following case: of actions, i.e., the properties that bear on the moral status of an action (e.g., Enoch [2014], Fletcher [2016], and Lord [2018]), or it cannot (or does not) yield moral understanding-why (Nickel [2001], Hopkins [2007], Hills [2009 and2010], McGrath [2011], and Callahan [2018]). 2 The moral claim is that because of the epistemic deficiency, moral deference is also in tension with gaining certain moral achievements, e.g., performing actions with moral worth or fittingly having the full range of affective and conative reactions to morally valenced situations.…”

“…Callahan (2018) also appeals to a version of the Achievement Explanation that is importantly different from those offered by other authors. However, everything I say against the Achievement Explanation applies to her account as well.3 Alternatively, these authors might offer an "Epistemic" Achievement Explanation according to which what explains the offputtingness of moral deference is the fact that it does not give one access to morally relevant properties or does not yield moral understanding-why.…”

Why you cannot make people better by telling them what is good

“…Pessimists about moral testimony agree with Williams that it would be intuitively problematic for the student to accept and act on a moral claim merely on the strength of the professor's authority (Callahan, 2018; Crisp, 2014; Hills, 2009; Hopkins, 2007; Howell, 2014; McGrath, 2009). If the student acted on the professor's testimony, her action would be less than ethically ideal, that is, she would not act well, at least not to the highest degree.…”