Morality, Uncertainty

Abstract

Non-Consequentialist moral theories posit the existence of moral constraints: prohibitions on performing particular kinds of wrongful acts, regardless of the good those acts could produce. Many have argued that such theories cannot give satisfactory verdicts about what we morally ought to do when there is some probability that we will violate a moral constraint. In this article, I defend Non-Consequentialist theories from this critique. Using a general choice-theoretic framework, I identify various types of Non-Consequentialism that have otherwise been conflated in the debate. I then prove a number of formal possibility and impossibility results establishing which types of Non-Consequentialism can—and which cannot—give us adequate guidance through through a risky world.

Can professional nursing value claims be refused? Might nursing values be accepted provisionally and tentatively?

“…Distinguishing intentional from non‐intentional actions presents difficulties (Schwenkler, 2019). Nonetheless, intended as opposed to accidental or unintended acts are morally risky insofar as, absent prescience, we do not in advance know (epistemic deficit) what benefits and harms accompany even everyday actions (Foot, 2001; Lee‐Stronach, 2021). However, regardless of intent, including values‐informed intent, value–act relations often dissolve upon inspection, but , more so even than non‐negotiability and universalism, this aspect of values discussion is underexplored in the nursing literature.…”