MoRVAM: A reverse Vickrey auction system for mobile commerce

Shih, Dong‐Her; Lin, Bin; Huang, Shih-Wei

doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2006.02.012

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Shamir's threshold cryptosystem is based on polynomial interpolation, and the fact that a unvaried polynomial d = f(c) of degree t -1 is uniquely defined by t points (ci,di) with distinct ci. These define t linearly independent equations in t unknowns [11]. As demonstrated by Liu [14]: "11 scientists are working on a secret project.…”

Section: B Shamir Threshold Crypto Systemmentioning

confidence: 98%

A secure E-tendering system

Mohammadi

Jahanshahi

2009

2009 IEEE International Conference on Electro/Information Technology

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Today E-tendering is increasingly being adopted through the world. An electronic environment presents obvious opportunities for collusion between principal and certain tenderers, fraud by tenderers and attempt of intruders to illegally access the system. In this paper, security requirements of an e-tendering system are described. Then the existing architecture of popular-tendering system are introduced. Then a new architecture for a highly secure E-tendering system is proposed. The new architecture uses encrypted iris pattern as biometric attribute for authentication of tenderers participating in a tender. The proposed architecture uses Shamir threshold crypto system for securing the e-tender box and imposes BellLaPadula security model on the access rights of parties involved in the e-tendering system.

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Section: B Shamir Threshold Crypto Systemmentioning

confidence: 98%

A secure E-tendering system

Mohammadi

Jahanshahi

2009

2009 IEEE International Conference on Electro/Information Technology

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“…As for sealed-bid auction, Shih et al and Jaiswal et al proposed their assumptions for that [28,29].…”

Section: Security Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A provable secure sealed‐bid multi‐attribute auction scheme under semi‐honest model

Shi

2013

Int J Communication

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SUMMARYSecure electronic auction protocol attracts increasing attention in the field of information security research. A variety of secure electronic auction protocols have achieved a lot. However, those studies mainly focus on price‐based auction model. There are few literatures involving security issues of multi‐attribute e‐auction. In recent years, the existing literatures mainly focus on the winner determination problem of multi‐attribute auction, but research of multi‐attribute e‐auction just begin from the perspective of information security. The proposal intends to start with the multi‐attribute e‐auction protocol, explores the different results in the multi‐attribute auction model because of different bid structures, focuses on qualitative attribute‐based winner determination auction model, proposes a new qualitative attribute‐based sealed‐bid multi‐attribute auction scheme under semi‐honest model for the first time. According to the security analysis and computation comparison, it provides strong bid privacy, public verifiability, and reasonable computational cost. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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“…They are increasingly being used in fields such as industry procurement (Strecker, 2004), supply chain management (Sadeh and Sun, 2003), electronic advertisement (Fu et al, 2012), service allocation (Pla et al, 2012c;Tavana et Al., 2013) and electronic commerce (Shih et Al., 2007). For instance, using auctions, manufacturers can obtain feedstock from their providers at the best economic conditions, while popular web sites can sell their ad space to the marketing companies which offer the most profitable revenue.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-attribute auctions with different types of attributes: Enacting properties in multi-attribute auctions

Plà

López

Murillo³

et al. 2014

Expert Systems with Applications

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Multi-attribute auctions allow agents to sell and purchase goods and services taking into account more attributes besides the price (e.g. service time, tolerances, qualities, etc.). In this paper we analyze attributes involved during the auction process and propose to classify them between verifiable attributes, unverifiable attributes and auctioneer provided attributes. According to this classification we present VMA2, a new Vickrey-based reverse multi-attribute auction mechanism which, taking into account the different types of attributes involved in the auction, allows the auction customization in order to suit the auctioneer needs. On the one hand, the use of auctioneer provided attributes enables the inclusion of different auction concepts such as social welfare, trust or robustness whilst, on the other hand, the use of verifiable attributes guarantee truthful bidding. The paper exemplifies the behaviour of VMA2 describing how an egalitarian allocation can be achieved. The mechanism is then tested in a simulated manufacturing environment and compared with other existing auction allocation methods.

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MoRVAM: A reverse Vickrey auction system for mobile commerce

Cited by 12 publications

References 24 publications

A secure E-tendering system

A secure E-tendering system

A provable secure sealed‐bid multi‐attribute auction scheme under semi‐honest model

Multi-attribute auctions with different types of attributes: Enacting properties in multi-attribute auctions

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