MOSQUITO: Covert Ultrasonic Transmissions Between Two Air-Gapped Computers Using Speaker-to-Speaker Communication

2018 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and I

2018

Self Cite

demo video (1): https://youtu.be/2WtiHZNeveY demo video (2): https://youtu.be/ddmHOvT866oAbstract-Cryptocurrency wallets store the wallets private key(s), and hence, are a lucrative target for attackers. With possession of the private key, an attacker virtually owns all of the currency in the compromised wallet. Managing cryptocurrency wallets offline, in isolated ('air-gapped') computers, has been suggested in order to secure the private keys from theft. Such air-gapped wallets are often referred to as 'cold wallets.'In this paper we show how private keys can be exfiltrated from air-gapped wallets. In the adversarial attack model, the attacker infiltrates the offline wallet, infecting it with malicious code. The malware can be preinstalled or pushed in during the initial installation of the wallet, or it can infect the system when removable media (e.g., USB flash drive) is inserted into the wallet's computer in order to sign a transaction. These attack vectors have repeatedly been proven feasible in the last decade (e.g., [1],[2],[3],[4],[5],[6],[7],[8],[9],[10]). Having obtained a foothold in the wallet, an attacker can utilize various air-gap covert channel techniques (bridgeware [ 11]) to jump the airgap and exfiltrate the wallets private keys. We evaluate various exfiltration techniques, including physical, electromagnetic, electric, magnetic, acoustic, optical, and thermal techniques. This research shows that although cold wallets provide a high degree of isolation, its not beyond the capability of motivated attackers to compromise such wallets and steal private keys from them. We demonstrate how a 256-bit private key (e.g., bitcoin's private keys) can be exfiltrated from an offline, air-gapped wallet of a fictional character named Satoshi within a matter of seconds 1 .

Section: B Exfiltrationmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: F Acousticmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Exfiltrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

BeatCoin: Leaking Private Keys from Air-Gapped Cryptocurrency Wallets

2018 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and I

2018

Self Cite

“…The aforementioned ultrasonic covert channels are relevant to environments in which the computers are equipped with both speakers and microphones, a less common setup in many secure environments. To overcome this limitation, Guri et al presented MOSQUITO [41] a malware that covertly turns headphones, earphones, or simple earbuds connected to a PC into a pair of microphones, even when a standard microphone is muted, taped, turned off or not present. Using this technique they established so-called speaker-to-speaker ultrasonic communication between two or more computers in the same room.…”

Section: E Acousticmentioning

confidence: 99%

PowerHammer: Exfiltrating Data From Air-Gapped Computers Through Power Lines

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

Zadov

Bykhovsky

et al. 2020

Self Cite

In this paper we provide an implementation, evaluation, and analysis of PowerHammer, a malware (bridgeware [1]) that uses power lines to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers. In this case, a malicious code running on a compromised computer can control the power consumption of the system by intentionally regulating the CPU utilization. Data is modulated, encoded, and transmitted on top of the current flow fluctuations, and then it is conducted and propagated through the power lines. This phenomena is known as a 'conducted emission'. We present two versions of the attack. Line level powerhammering: In this attack, the attacker taps the in-home power lines 1 that are directly attached to the electrical outlet. Phase level power-hammering: In this attack, the attacker taps the power lines at the phase level, in the main electrical service panel. In both versions of the attack, the attacker measures the emission conducted and then decodes the exfiltrated data. We describe the adversarial attack model and present modulations and encoding schemes along with a transmission protocol. We evaluate the covert channel in different scenarios and discuss signal-to-noise (SNR), signal processing, and forms of interference. We also present a set of defensive countermeasures. Our results show that binary data can be covertly exfiltrated from air-gapped computers through the power lines at bit rates of 1000 bit/sec for the line level power-hammering attack and 10 bit/sec for the phase level power-hammering attack. Power stationStep up transformerStep down transformerStep down transformer Residential building 22kV output 400 kV 132 kV 11 kV Fig. 1: A (simplified) schematic diagram of the electricity network C. Exfiltration through Power LinesIn this paper, we present a new type of electric (current flow) covert channel. The method, dubbed PowerHammer, enables attackers to exfiltrate information from air-gapped networks through AC power lines. We show that a malware running on a computer can regulate the power consumption of the system by controlling the workload of the CPU. Binary data can be modulated on the changes of the current flow, propagated through the power lines, and intercepted by an attacker. We present two versions of the attack. In line level power-hammering the adversary taps the power cables feeding the transmitting computer. In phase level power-hammering the adversary taps the power lines at the phase level, in the main electrical service panel. Using a non-invasive tap, the attacker measures the emission conducted on the power cables. Based on the signal received, the transmitted data is demodulated and decoded back to a binary form.

“…This research showed how to utilize computer fans and hard disk drive actuator arms to generate covert sound signals. In 2018, Guri et al introduced MOSQUITO [15] malware that covertly turns speakers connected to a PC into a pair of microphones. Using this technique they established socalled speaker-to-speaker air-gap communication between two computers in the same room via ultrasonic waves.…”

Section: A Electromagnetic Magnetic Acoustic and Thermalmentioning

confidence: 99%

CTRL-ALT-LED: Leaking Data from Air-Gapped Computers Via Keyboard LEDs

2019 IEEE 43rd Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC)

Zadov

Bykhovsky

et al. 2019

Self Cite

Using the keyboard LEDs to send data optically was proposed in 2002 by Loughry and Umphress [1] (Appendix A). In this paper we extensively explore this threat in the context of a modern cyber-attack with current hardware and optical equipment. In this type of attack, an advanced persistent threat (APT) uses the keyboard LEDs (Caps-Lock, Num-Lock and Scroll-Lock) to encode information and exfiltrate data from airgapped computers optically. Notably, this exfiltration channel is not monitored by existing data leakage prevention (DLP) systems. We examine this attack and its boundaries for today's keyboards with USB controllers and sensitive optical sensors. We also introduce smartphone and smartwatch cameras as components of malicious insider and 'evil maid' attacks. We provide the necessary scientific background on optical communication and the characteristics of modern USB keyboards at the hardware and software level, and present a transmission protocol and modulation schemes. We implement the exfiltration malware, discuss its design and implementation issues, and evaluate it with different types of keyboards. We also test various receivers, including light sensors, remote cameras, 'extreme' cameras, security cameras, and smartphone cameras. Our experiment shows that data can be leaked from air-gapped computers via the keyboard LEDs at a maximum bit rate of 3000 bit/sec per LED given a light sensor as a receiver, and more than 120 bit/sec if smartphones are used. The attack doesn't require any modification of the keyboard at hardware or firmware levels.