Motions with Emotions?

Abstract

This article examines how the interactive capabilities of companion robots, particularly their materiality and animate movements, appeal to human users and generate an image of aliveness. Building on Husserl's phenomenological notion of a 'double body' and theories of emotions as affective responses, we develop a new understanding of the robots' simulated aliveness. Analyzing empirical findings of a field study on the use of the robot Zora in care homes for older people, we suggest that the aliveness of companion robots is the result of a combination of four aspects: 1) material ingredients, 2) morphology, 3) animate movements guided by software programs and human operators as in Wizard of Oz-settings and 4) anthropomorphising narratives created by their users to support the robot's performance. We suggest that narratives on affective states, such as, sleepiness or becoming frightened attached to the robot trigger users' empathic feelings, caring and tenderness toward the robot.

Toward Abiozoomorphism in Social Robotics? Discussion of a New Category between Mechanical Entities and Living Beings

“…In parallel, zoomorphic interfaces refer to animal-like qualities in design. The dynamics of zoomorphism and anthropomorphism is closely linked to the design of social robots because, for example, animal-shaped robots can have human-like gestures, or fictional (sci-fi) robot characters can combine animal and human figures (Parviainen et al 2019).…”

“…Masahiro Mori's (1970) seminal research on humanoid robots suggested that our affective reactions to robots have strongly influenced how these objects move, creating the illusion of "self-moving" living beings. Taking this idea further, robots' gestural movements and their intellectual capabilities are seen as intrinsically connected (Parviainen et al 2019). Maurice Merleau-Ponty's (1962) phenomenological discussion of motor intentionality as embodied intelligence illuminates reasons that we are inclined to associate bodily movements and gestures with cognition.…”

“…After all, in the context of cybernetics, Haraway (2007) herself suggests wheelchairs as something to be considered as a companion species. In animistic cultures (e.g., Japan), robots and even smartphones are perceived as belonging to a third category, between the living and the lifeless-anthropomorphized as not alive, but not soulless machines either (Barile and Sugiyama 2015, 415;Šabanović 2014;Parviainen et al 2019). Still, when it comes to robots, we argue that it is particularly questionable to use the term "species" because this adds to the unrealistic expectations and uninformed mental representations people have about anthropomorphized machines.…”