Motivation and Cognitive Control: From Behavior to Neural Mechanism

Abstract

Research on cognitive control and executive function has long recognized the relevance of motivational factors. Recently, however, the topic has come increasingly to center stage, with a surge of new studies examining the interface of motivation and cognitive control. In the present article we survey research situated at this interface, considering work from cognitive and social psychology and behavioral economics, but with a particular focus on neuroscience research. We organize existing findings into three core areas, considering them in the light of currently vying theoretical perspectives. Based on the accumulated evidence, we advocate for a view of control function that treats it as a domain of reward-based decision making. More broadly, we argue that neuroscientific evidence plays a critical role in understanding the mechanisms by which motivation and cognitive control interact. Opportunities for further cross-fertilization between behavioral and neuroscientific research are highlighted.

Semantic Conflict Mobilizes Self-Control in a Realistic Task

“…Such conflict may act as a red alarm, informing the human mind that something is going wrong with its information processing and/or its environment, and that more careful, as well as task-focused, behavior is required. This fact also suggests, in line with recent proposals (e.g., Botvinick and Braver 2015;Inzlicht et al 2014), that self-control and motivation may be more strongly intertwined than it was supposed earlier. However the nature of their interaction remains to be discovered in future research.…”

“…In the modern parlance of self-control research, such an increase in motivation can be referred to as the increased strength of self-control, or of executive control (Botvinick and Braver 2015). However, there were few studies that examined the influence of semantic conflict, which was understood as cognitive dissonance that resulted from the contradictory meaning of mental representations, on the strength of exerted control.…”

Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment

“…However, although it is possible for effortful activation of (d) circuitry to influence motivation and behavior, it appears that these effects are indirect, and that the mechanisms involved in conscious reasoning and working memory are dissociable from those more directly involved in the regulation of motivation and affect. in the first place, structures involved in domain-general working memory-such as the dlPFC-do not seem to have any special relationship to motivation, as they are involved in manipulating information in working memory across a number of domains (Barbey et al 2013;Botvinick & Braver 2015;Chein et al 2011;Fedorenko et al 2013). Moreover, whereas studies of evaluative thought regularly implicate (a)-(c) circuitry, (d) circuits are only occasionally found to be activated.…”

“…6 However, people generally seem to be averse to investing the effort associated with these processes and prefer to avoid doing so. it is therefore thought that Type 2 processes are primarily recruited when the effort is expected to pay off, for example in cases where Type 1 processes issue conflicting results, or when the stakes are high (Braver & Botvinick 2015;Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen 2013). As a result, dual-process models often treat the rapid, continuous, specialized activity of Type 1 processes as the "default" pathway, and Type 2 processes as exercising oversight over Type 1 processes 6.…”

“…it appears that these circuits constitute distinct control systems that can compete with or influence the activity of the (a)-(c) circuits. For example, purposefully focusing one's attention on the healthiness of food options can affect one's eating choices, and this effect appears to be mediated by activity in the dlPFC modulating activity in the vmPFC (Hare, Malmaud, & rangel 2011;see also Baumgartner, Knoch, Hotz, eisenegger, & Fehr 2011;Botvinick & Braver 2015;Hare et al 2009;Hutcherson, Plassmann, Gross, & rangel 2012;Ocshner & Gross 2005;Plassmann, O'Doherty, Shiv, & rangel 2008;rudorf & Hare 2014;Shenhav et al 2013;Sokol-Hessner, Hutcherson, Hare, & rangel 2012). These changes can also be broadcast back to (a) and (b) circuitry, thereby influencing one's motivation (Pujara & Koenigs 2014).…”