Motivation and opportunity for conflict-induced migration: An analysis of Syrian migration timing

Abstract

How do civilians decide when to leave their homes during conflict? Existing research emphasizes the role of violence in driving civilian migration decisions. Yet, migration timing often does not correspond with the timing of violence. To explain this discrepancy, I argue that violence fits within broader considerations of motivation and opportunity to migrate. Witnessing violence triggers post-traumatic growth that delays narrative ruptures and the subsequent migration that they motivate. Civilians who have ‘wasta’ – an advantaged social position resulting from some combination of money and connections – have the opportunity to migrate safely. Civilians who possess both motivation and opportunity migrate earlier. I use over 170 structured interviews with Syrian refugees in Turkey to test this argument. Descriptively, respondents who did not witness violence (early motivation) left their homes seven months earlier, on average. Respondents with wasta (opportunity) left their homes one full year earlier, on average. Respondents who both did not witness violence (early motivation) and had wasta left their homes approximately one and a half years earlier, on average. Cox proportional hazard models reveal that respondents only migrated earlier in the conflict if they had both early motivation and opportunity. Open-ended responses from the interviews support the quantitative results and help explain their causal mechanisms. These findings contribute to understandings of conflict-induced migration, civil war, and the Syrian conflict.

A persuasive peace: Syrian refugees’ attitudes towards compromise and civil war termination

“…how they are contextualized or framed. For instance, in this volume, Schon (2019) argues that refugees' migration decisions in the face of violence may depend on whether their experience of violence can be reconciled with an existing narrative about security.…”

The Dynamics of Refugee Return: Syrian Refugees and Their Migration Intentions

“…Indeed, an influential conventional wisdom holds that the return of refugees is largely a post-conflict phenomenon. 1 This presumption is plausible as forced migration is often driven by violence (Davenport, Moore and Poe, 2003;Adhikari, 2013;Schon, 2019; Holland and Peters, 2020), and the end of hostilities in the home country may be a major driver of refugee return. In fact, when conflicts come to an end, refugees often find themselves pushed to return by aid agencies in neighboring countries that see their funding dry up and by governments that feel overstretched by hosting displaced persons (Crisp, 2019).…”

Comparative Analysis Of Models By Adaptation Of Immigrants

“…As of January 1 the totality of the citizens of unstable countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia registered in Russia was, more than 2 million people what constitutes a significant share in the structure of migration flows in Russia. The risk of widening negative consequences and the risk of potential social destabilization in attractive regions persist and with increasing social discontent (primarily a decline in living standards and financial situation, widening the gap between the super-rich and the poor) can lead to social destabilization (Schon, 2018;Akanle, 2018;Hovden, Mjelde, & Gripsrud, 2018;Freeman, 2017).…”