Motivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

Abstract

This paper examines how motivation, crowding and social image affect environmental conservation decisions. An artefactual field experiment conducted in Bolivia is used to reproduce the trade-off between individual and social benefits in natural resource use and test the effect of non-monetary and non-regulatory incentives on pro-social behavior for environmental conservation. The results show the presence of a social norm prescribing positive contribution towards environmental protection, and that external incentives have heterogeneous effects on pro-social behavior depending on how they influence reputation and self-image. The experimental results differ from those of analogous experiments conducted in the laboratory, and are instead consistent with those from field experiments on common-pool resource management. This fact suggests caution in generalizing conclusions, reached in the laboratory, to different settings and populations.

Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS) in Mexico: a theoretic ideal or everyday practice?

“…We argue that experiences from the management of common-pool resources (CPR) (Ostrom 2007(Ostrom , 2015 and environmental conflict resolution (O'Leary and Bingham 2003) can inform researchers and practitioners engaged with PGS, help identify solutions and suggest new action strategies. To interpret the results, reference is made to studies on community-based management of protected forests (Idrissou et al 2011) and marine areas (Gurney et al 2016), community forest governance (Barnes and Van Laerhoven 2013;Black and Watson 2006;Ravikumar et al 2013;Van Laerhoven and Andersson 2013), reforestation of communal land (d 'Adda 2011), joint water management (Black and Watson 2006) and common property grazing resources (Vedeld 2000;Vollan 2008), in addition to the concept of social cohesion applied as a theoretical framework in some of these studies (Kawachi and Berkman 2014;Kearns and Forrest 2000). Although not perfectly comparable, following Nelson et al (2016, p. 375), who argue that "the integrity of Mexico's local organic markets can be considered a common-pool resource", it was found that some analogical conclusions could be expanded to the PGS context.…”

“…Voluntary collective action is not nurtured (Vollan 2008). Nonmaterial incentive mechanisms (e.g., priming on desired behaviour) may show similar effects but to a lower degree (d 'Adda 2011). However, care should be taken when designing a strategy for encouraging actor participation and deciding whether to set incentives or not, which ones to set and how (Gurney et al 2016).…”

“…Material incentives are commonly used to facilitate the participation of local actors in CPR management (d 'Adda 2011;Gurney et al 2016;Idrissou et al 2011;Vollan 2008). However, providing external (material) incentives can have detrimental effects, as externally provided incentives may replace the actors' intrinsic motivation for participating.…”

Determinants of conservation among the rural poor: A charitable contribution experiment

“…Membership in community associations is found to be associated with higher contribution to conservation projects in two artefactual field experiments in Latin America (d 'Adda, 2011a;d'Adda, 2011b).…”

Communication, Observability and Cooperation: a Field Experiment on Collective Water Management in India

“…By increasing the observability of behaviour, individuals can monitor each other, and free-riders can be identified and sanctioned using fines as well nonpecuniary punishments, such as social disapproval and shame (Rege and Telle, 2004;Loewenstein, 2000). This motivates cooperation because most people prefer to be well-regarded amongst peers and to have a positive view of themselves (Benabou & Tirole, 2005;2011). There are many group-based experiments in which a first-mover or 'leader' makes a publicly observable contribution before anyone else in their group.…”