MP behavior in mixed-member electoral systems

Keynes, Friedman, or Monnet? Explaining parliamentary voting behaviour on fiscal aid for euro area member states

“…This contrasts with findings by Becher and Sieberer (2008) and by Sieberer (2010) on the impact of mandate types on Bundestag votes between 1983 and 2009. Our findings could however be explained by the potentially detrimental impact of double candidacies on the party list and in a district (Stoffel 2014) on the MP's incentive structure. The insignificance of any district characteristics in turn contrasts with the literature on the US system, where local, constituency-related interests seem to play an important role for MP voting behaviour on international political economy issues (Broz 2005;Tingley 2010, 2011).…”

“…Becher and Sieberer 2008;Kunicova and Remington 2008), we would finally expect district rather than party list representatives to care more about their constituencies' concerns. On the one hand, we are aware that many party list MPs, especially those of the big parties CDU, CSU, and SPD, should have a realistic chance to win the direct mandate in the next general elections, offering them a 'dual candidacy option' (Stoffel 2014). On the other hand, we also note that this usually does not account for members of the smaller parties FDP, Greens, and Die Linke.…”

Electoral Rules and Legislative Parties in the Ukrainian Rada

“…The mixing of party‐centered and candidate‐centered electoral tiers leads to the expectation by some that such systems will produce legislatures containing members divided by these conflicting incentives. The search for this divide in mixed‐member systems has spawned a significant number of studies (e.g., Crisp ; Heller and Mershon ; Lancaster and Patterson ; Herron ; Morlang ; Smith and Remington ; Stoffel ; Stratmann and Baur ; Thames ).…”

“…Some find that majoritarian legislators are less cohesive (Thames 2001), are more interested in positions on committees that could provide better access to pork (Stratmann and Baur 2002), and are more interested in constituency service (Lancaster and Patterson 1990). Others find that the impact of the electoral system is mitigated by other factors such as electoral status (Herron 2002;Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss 2006), party affiliation (Haspel, Remington, and Smith 1998), the ability to run in both the listand majoritarian-tier election (Stoffel 2014), and the level of partysystem institutionalization (Thames 2005a). For others, differences in majoritarian-tier and list-tier behaviors depends upon what aspect of legislative behavior is analyzed (Crisp 2007;Smith and Remington 2001).…”

“…There is significant variation in the rules that govern mixed‐member systems across different cases; however, at their core, all mixed‐member systems combine a list election, for example, closed‐list PR, with a majoritarian election, for example, SMD plurality. The different incentives for legislative behavior created by these divergent electoral systems spawned a number of studies seeking to find evidence of divisions within the behavior of legislators in these systems (e.g., Heller and Mershon ; Herron ; Lancaster and Patterson ; Morlang ; Smith and Remington ; Stoffel ; Stratmann and Baur ; Thames ).While there is a significant amount of research on this topic, it has not reached a definitive conclusion on whether the presence of legislators elected by different electoral rules, leads to differences in legislative behavior in mixed‐member systems.…”