Much Ado About Nothing: A Study of Metaphysical Nihilism

Cameron, Ross P.

doi:10.1007/s10670-005-3637-5

Cited by 13 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“… 13 Efird and Stoneham argue that the subtraction argument gives us independent reason to think that there's an empty world (Efird and Stoneham, 2005). We disagree, and think that Cameron (2005, in particular 204–209) and Paseau (2006) both present strong cases for thinking the subtraction argument is not effective. But even supposing the subtraction argument were successful this would not mean that the empty world is a consequence of PR as Efird and Stoneham (2008, 492) argue.…”

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confidence: 80%

Lewis's Principle of Recombination: Reply to Efird and Stoneham

Darby¹,

Watson²

2010

Dialectica

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According to Lewis's modal realism, all ways the world could be are represented by possible worlds, and all possible worlds represent some way the world could be. That there are just the right possible worlds to represent all and only the ways the world could be is to be guaranteed by the principle of recombination. Lewis sketches the principle (put roughly: anything can co‐exist with anything else), but does not spell out a precise version that generates just the right possibilities. David Efird and Tom Stoneham have offered a principle that aims to do just that. In this paper, we argue that Efird's and Stoneham's principle of recombination is not successful – it fails to generate the right possibilities – but we also suggest ways that their account might be improved to solve the problem we raise. We also argue against Efird's and Stoneham's claim that the correct principle of recombination demonstrates the possibility of nothing concrete – it is true that their principle of recombination has models consistent with the existence of an empty world, but we only get the possibility of nothing if mereologically null individuals are possible. The Lewisian should only think mereologically null individuals are possible if he or she has some independent reason for believing in the possibility of an empty world, so the principle of recombination provides no new evidence for that possibility. We draw some morals from this for the correct way to formulate the principle of recombination.

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confidence: 80%

Lewis's Principle of Recombination: Reply to Efird and Stoneham

Darby¹,

Watson²

2010

Dialectica

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“…It is also controversial what ontological nihilism really amounts to (see e.g. Hawthorne and Cortens 1995, Cameron 2006, and Turner 2011. And if we take it to be the doctrine that there are no concrete objects, as seems plausible, it is controversial even whether it is possibly true (as discussed below).…”

Section: Commentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nothing, Everything, Something!

Varzi

2022

Logic, Argumentation &Amp; Reasoning

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At one extreme, we find everything; at the other-nothing. The large territory in between is a prerogative of the remainder, conveniently labeled under the generic heading of 'something'. To be sure, from a logical viewpoint 'something' may be said to encompass 'everything' as a special case (though not 'nothing', which is strictly out). But even so, the friend of something is typically happy to stop halfway. Ask a question, they will generally go for a moderate answer. Draw a map, they will generally focus on the details in the middle. The polar extremes-they think-are too far-fetched to be taken seriously.Because of this, the friend of something tends to enjoy all the comfort that a central seat can provide. Yet this comfort comes with a heavy burden. It's not enough to say something; you have to draw a line. It's not enough to dismiss the extremes; you have to say exactly where in the middle you are going to settle. And that is far from easy. Think of the sort of questions that have been driving so many a debate in contemporary philosophy. Under what conditions do certain facts depend on others? Under what conditions are we responsible for our deeds? Under what conditions does a plurality of things compose a whole? Under what conditions is it permissible to limit individual freedom? When it comes to questions such as these, and many others indeed, universalist and nihilist answers may be extreme, but they are clear enough: under every condition whatsoever, or else under no condition at all. Aliquidist answers, by contrast, are always caught between the Scylla of vagueness and indeterminacy and the Charybdis of ungroundedness and arbitrariness, if not parochialism, and steering a proper middle coursespecifying and justifying the relevant conditions-demands exceptional navigating powers.I myself have generally been favoring extreme answers precisely for this reason. Here I am not going not elaborate, though. On the contrary, I want to report a conversation I heard recently that made me think perhaps there is a sense in which aliquidism is superior to its extreme alternatives. I am not sure it would be enough to rescue its friends from the treacherous waters that surround them. Given the context, however, it seems appropriate to share it. I have transcribed it in full, adding just a few personal comments in the form of endnotes to clarify my own understanding of the basic terms. A trialogue Nothing. Happy to see you, dear friends. You know what? I pondered the matter for a long time and I think I have finally cleared my mind. The nihilists are right. Nothing exists! 1 Something. I knew one day you'd say that. But allow me to point out that you just contradicted yourself. And the very fact that you contradicted yourself proves my point: something exists! But only something, of course, not everything. Everything. And so you've just contradicted yourself, too. Come on, where have you two been all these years? 2 Just as you cannot say that nothing exists, which is indeed self-defeating, you cannot say that something d...

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“…It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss whether either (i) or (ii) are genuinely possible. However, many are unsure as to whether (i) is genuinely possible (Cameron himself seems to be agnostic as to the possibility of (i) (Cameron 2006)). In particular, since the possibility of (i) has sometimes been used as a premise in arguments for the existence of God, philosophers seem to assume, if (b) is false (as we are assuming now), then (i) is not genuinely possible But, if (i) is not genuinely possible, then, if (a) is to be true, the non-existence of some contingent beings (i.e.…”

Section: Cameron Writesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since writing this, I discovered that this principled was explicitly used inBaldwin (1996 cited in Cameron 2006 as part of an argument for the possibility of (i) and is explicitly rejected byCameron (2006).…”

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confidence: 99%

Modal truthmakers and two varieties of actualism

Contessa

2008

Synthese

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In this paper, I distinguish between two varieties of actualism-hardcore actualism and softcore actualism-and I critically discuss Ross Cameron's recent arguments for preferring a softcore actualist account of the truthmakers for modal truths over hardcore actualist ones. In the process, I offer some arguments for preferring the hardcore actualist account of modal truthmakers over the softcore actualist one.

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Much Ado About Nothing: A Study of Metaphysical Nihilism

Cited by 13 publications

References 14 publications

Lewis's Principle of Recombination: Reply to Efird and Stoneham

Lewis's Principle of Recombination: Reply to Efird and Stoneham

Nothing, Everything, Something!

Modal truthmakers and two varieties of actualism

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