Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study

Abstract

We examine behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi-battle contests, where each individual battle is modeled as an all-pay auction with complete information. In simultaneous bestof-three contests, subjects are predicted to make positive bids in all three battles, but we find that subjects often make positive bids in only two battles. In sequential contests, theory predicts sizable bids in the first battle and no bids in the subsequent battles. Contrary to this prediction, subjects significantly underbid in the first battle and overbid in subsequent battles. Consequently, instead of always ending in the second battle, contests often proceeds to the third battle. Finally, although the aggregate bid in simultaneous contests is similar to that in sequential contests, in both settings, subjects make higher aggregate bids than predicted. The observed behavior of subjects can be rationalized by a combination of multi-dimensional iterative reasoning and a non-monetary utility of winning.JEL Classifications: C72, C91, D72

When Unequals Compete: Where Do They Stand After the Competition?

“…Roberson and Kvasov but it was only for three fields and for symmetric players; Mago and Sheremeta (2017) tested behavior in such a multifield contest. 5 The number of participants in the 4F condition was double that in the 1F condition to allow for a comparison of allocation to different fields.…”

Gerrymandering in the laboratory

“…While there are other experiments that look at multi-battle contests, those studies tend to focus on blotto style game such asMago and Sheremeta (2017) or sequential contests such asMago et al (2013).…”