Multi-level governance of the digital space: does a “second rank” institutional framework exist?

Abstract

Digital Technologies make it possible to decentrally settle institutional frameworks based on self-implementation of exclusive rights of use over information and on the self-regulation of on-line communities. Such a decentralized systems of IPRs and collective rules settlement would enable agents to benefit from coordination frames well adapted to their specific needs and preference. However, such a process can also result in inefficiencies. While becoming subject to exclusion, information and coordination spaces remain non-divisible goods. Moreover, individual and group of interests could succeed in taking a non-contestable control over "privatized" information spaces. To overcome these weaknesses and threats, an institution of last resort -overhanging the agents and the self-regulated communitiesshould design and make enforceable constitutional principles aimed at guaranteeing some fundamental rights of contents producers and users. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, it should supervise the behaviors of individuals and communities to prevent capture of public wealth by individual interests, to solve conflicts among claims and local regulations, to guarantee enforcement when exclusive rights of use are legitimate. The way to implement it is however questionable since neither central authority of last resort nor global community exist to implement it. A combination of open while centralized negotiations among public and private norm settlers and of conflict settlement mechanism aimed at harmonizing the proliferating orders could nevertheless lead to the progressive definition of such constitutional basic rights and principles.

The Economics of Digital Business Models: A Framework for Analyzing the Economics of Platforms

“…Plenty of literature exists on how the ubiquity, seamlessness, and integration of digital technologies favour knowledge management processes that result in innovation. Beyond the falling costs for gathering, sorting, storing and retrieving information, digital technologies empower the producers and users of information goods by providing them with capabilities to implement on a highly customized basis (if needed), specific rules for using and sharing information (Brousseau, 2003(Brousseau, , 2007and Elkin-Koren and Salzberger, 2004). These result in de-facto self-enforcing contracts or self-enforcing regulations, which allow for playing on incentives to produce information and to seek for efficiency in managing access and distribution.…”

The institutional economics of sharing biological information

“…In particular, in changing and controversial social contexts, no evaluation in advance of the best possible institutional solution can be made. For this reason several authors (Brousseau 2005; Denzau and North 1994; Eggerston 1990; Knight and North 1997; Ostrom 1998; Rai 1999) have argued in favour of adopting a dynamic approach to economic efficiency. Such an approach is not geared towards the allocation of resources and institutional means in advance, but rather towards creating incentives for permanent adaptation and innovation through reflexive processes of social learning and institutional experimentation.…”

The Institutional Dynamics of Sharing Biological Information : Towards Reflexive Governance of the Information Society

“…Further, even in the cases where one reasonably can make a trade off between the different "second-best" options, one still has to consider how to change the existing institutions in the direction of the new collaborative arrangements. For this reason several authors (Ostrom 1998, Eggerston 1990, Denzau and North 1994, Knight and North 1997, Rai 1999, Brousseau 2005) have tried to address specifically the problem of institutional dynamics. In particular, analysis has focused on the creation of incentives for institutional adaptation and innovation through reflexive processes of social learning and institutional experimentation.…”