Multi-level Parties in Process: Scottish and Welsh MEPs and their Home Parties

Abstract

Regional autonomy and European integration present national institutions with a double challenge, potentially diluting national authority from both below and above. The interaction between the two processes adds a particular dynamic, as when regions forge direct links to the EU bypassing the nation state. This article looks at three British parties from that perspective, focusing on the autonomy of party branches in Scotland and Wales in relation to their Members of the European Parliament. The empirical analysis confirms that devolution has enhanced the potential for regional autonomy in the parties. However, this has had little practical effect on European policy-making, where national unity prevails. The limited effect of devolution can be explained, first, by the hegemonic status of national party unity and, second, by the disadvantages of operating alone in the European Parliament. An interesting parallel can be drawn to the way subnational authorities relate to EU institutions.Regional autonomy and European integration present national institutions with a double challenge, potentially diluting their authority from both below and above. Britain is an instructive example. Here, the political power of London has been constrained by regionalisation in the form of devolution to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales since 1999. 1 In the same period, policies emanating from the European Union have continued to permeate both national and regional politics (Bache 2008). Devolution implies a new set of opportunity structures at the regional level, changing the terrain in which political parties operate. The research question discussed in this paper is whether devolution has also enabled regional party branches to obtain more autonomy from the state-wide parties in European policy-making. Such autonomy should be visible in enhanced discretion over the selection of candidates and programmes as well as in the forging of direct links to the EU level. British parties are particularly relevant in this regard since Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) since 1999 have been elected on a regional basis, using

The Multi-Level Governance of Wales: Layer Cake or Marble Cake?

“…Increasingly it appears that, despite talk of a Europe of the regions, the new regional governments are seriously restricted in their interactions with EU institutions (Murphy 2011). Elias explains (2008, 558) that the ‘sovereign states have retained a firm control on the direction and scope of European integration, and have constrained the degree to which Europe's historical nations and regions have been able to participate in the governance of Europe.’ Writing specifically of the UK, Bratberg concludes that the ‘Scottish and Welsh subnational authorities find that their views are best promoted through privileged access to member state representation rather than “going it alone” by liaising with the Commission or the Council’ (Bratberg 2010, 865). A conclusion which is remarkably consistent with that of (Bache 1999, 38; Bache and Bristow 2003), who writing ten years earlier, found evidence that ‘despite the efforts of the Commission and the mobilization of subnational actors, an extended gatekeeper role was successfully played by the UK central government.’…”

“…Finally, without the local sovereignty to make authoritative decisions, Peters and Pierre describe ‘negotiated, non‐hierarchical exchanges between institutions at the transnational, national, regional and local levels’ (2001, 131). In marked contrast to the layer cake, these interactions allow local and regional authorities to go ‘beyond’ rather than ‘through’ the nation state as Jeffery puts it (, 4; Beyers and Bursens ; Heinelt and Niederhafner ; Bratberg ).…”

‘Tissue on the Bones’: Towards the Development of a Post-structuralist Institutionalism

“…As institutional case studies political parties are obvious subjects of analysis from a PSI perspective, offering, as they do, institutions famous for their internal conflicts and ideological divisions. This is additionally true when dealing with the institutional complexities of horizontal and vertical power relations within a ‘multi-level party’ such as the post-devolution British Labour Party, operating at local, regional, national and supranational levels (Bratberg, 2010; Moon and Bratberg, 2010). This is not to say that PSI can be applied only to political parties; far from it.…”

Conceptualising the Multi-Level Party: Two Complementary Approaches

“…With regard to the formal characteristics, the MLP could be defined as ‘a party organisation with multiple lines of accountability and a division of authority between relatively autonomous party sections below and above the national level’ (Bratberg, 2009). Analysing the MLP implies an awareness of changes in internal allocation of power.…”

“…Especially when (re)selection is outside the control of the party leadership, MEPs may strengthen their loyalties towards the regional branch as well as to their party family in the EP. In the British case, MEPs representing Scotland and Wales are particularly interesting: Britain is one of only five Member States using regional constituencies for EP elections, which may enhance the multi‐levelness of the parties by adding legitimacy to Scottish and Welsh interests on the European scene (Bratberg, 2009). These party branches may see their position in the party strengthened overall as a consequence of their link to the EP.…”