Multi‐Level Policy Implementation: A Case Study on China's Administrative Approval Intermediaries’ Reforms

Abstract

Policy output and outcome shortfalls are often attributable to deficits in implementation. Drawing on data collected from multi-level governmental documents and in-depth interviews regarding the ongoing reforms of the use of 'administrative approval intermediaries' in China, we identified a genre of policy implementation in which the policy implementers themselves are targets of reform. These implementers swing between fulfilling tasks and deviation from formal requirements. By illustrating how the implementation gap in the reform widened as the implementation moved downstream and the exercise of centralized authority deteriorated, we found that the implementation deficits worsen as the targets' interests were increasingly undermined by the policy. This was largely due to an administrative design in which the objective was established at the top, implementation depended on change by the bottom and coordination was horizontal across the middle.

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The Moderating Role of Top‐Down Supports in Horizontal Innovation Diffusion

“…Previous research on China's ALCs has found that the diffusion of ALCs in China is influenced by local socioeconomic conditions, official characteristics, and external pressures (Zhu and Zhang 2016;Zhu and Zhao 2018). More qualitative information on the creation of ALCs in China can be found in Zhu and Jiao (2012), Zhu (2014), and Zhang and Rosenbloom (2018).…”

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“…As Zhan et al (2013) argued, implementation deficits in China have been an enduring problem. This administrative structure leaves subcentral government with significant discretion on how to achieve the central-level policy goals thereby exacerbating the complexity of policy implementation (N. Zhang & Rosenbloom, 2018).…”

“…Policy deficits are usually considered as a flaw in policy goal fulfillment (Ahlers & Schubert, 2014;Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979). Policies can be eroded to a great extent in the process of multilevel implementation (N. Zhang & Rosenbloom, 2018). The probability of implementation deficits increases as the number of administrative layers increases (Elmore, 1979).…”

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