Multi - party Game Analysis of Coal Industry and Industry Regulation Policy Optimization

Jiang, Tianqi

doi:10.1088/1755-1315/108/3/032003

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Cheng et al [31] proposed countermeasures through statistical analysis from 30 Chinese provinces from 1997 to 2014, and provided a model for carrying out empirical research on impact reductions and technical progress under policy regulation. Jiang [32] constructed a multi-game subject evolution game model, including central and local governments, coal mining enterprises and miners, theoretical analysis and numerical simulation of the model. The evolutionary game theory was proposed by the British scholar Smith [33].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Study of Clean Heating Promotion Mechanisms under the Policy Regulation in China

Wang

Tan

et al. 2019

Sustainability

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Recently, various Chinese provinces have greatly reduced their coal consumption due to new environmental protection policies. Because of these policies, the orderly development of the clean energy heating mode has been effectively promoted. As the problem of air pollution in the northern part of China is particularly prominent, adopting clean heating in winter is an important solution to control air pollution for those regions. However, there is a tricky balance to be struck between the government and the heating companies when it comes to using clean heating during winter. Therefore, it is crucial for the government and heating enterprises to research new strategies. Consequently, this paper carries out a comprehensive study on the multiple factors influencing the game relationship between the government and heating enterprises, and tries to set up a more general model for the theoretical analysis of mechanisms of clean heating promotion, as well as their numerical simulation. The research results show: (1) The initial possibilities available to government and heating enterprises have a significant impact on the final strategy choice for the heating system; (2) due to advantages such as increases in social benefits, subsidies, fines, and clean heating profits, as well as the lessening of traditional heating costs, and regardless of the decrease in traditional heating profits, it is possible for the government to adopt the promotion strategy; and (3) there are more opportunities for heating companies to pursue in order to implement clean heating strategies. In conclusion, this paper proposes valuable suggestions for the government and heating companies concerning clean heating in China.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Study of Clean Heating Promotion Mechanisms under the Policy Regulation in China

Wang

Tan

et al. 2019

Sustainability

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“…Game theory has been widely used in many fields and is of great significance to economics, engineering and sociology [16]. Game theory has also been applied to the improvement of energy, resources and environment, such as coal mine safety accidents [17,18], safety management measures [19], optimal allocation of defensive resources [20], the interaction between stakeholders in safety inspection system [21,22], and energy price based on environmental protection and game theory [23]. Game theory has also been used to study the impact of worker mobility [24], tax revenue in the thermal power industry [25] and the relevant interactive relationship between government, small enterprises and employees [26].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Dynamic Evolution Law of Coal Mine Workers’ Behavior Risk Based on Game Theory

Liu

et al. 2022

Sustainability

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In the safety production system of coal mining enterprises, the income of workers affects the evolution of group behavior and then affects risky behaviors. Due to the nonlinearity and chaos of group behavior, its evolution is long and complex. This study investigated the dynamic evolution process of coal miners’ group behavior to explore the law of group safety behavior and effectively promoted the safety of group behavior. First, a questionnaire survey was conducted on the influencing factors of coal mine workers’ group safety behavior. Then, based on the results of the questionnaire, the coefficients of the influencing factors were obtained, and the game model was established. Finally, the game income was simulated and analyzed. The results showed that the income of workers was positively correlated with the safety of group behavior. Safety performance could effectively improve the level of group safety behavior. The safety management system of coal mining enterprises was further improved and expanded and was applied. The statistical analysis of the violations showed that the results of this study could be used to influence the risky group behavior of coal mine workers and improve the level of coal mine safety production.

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Multi - party Game Analysis of Coal Industry and Industry Regulation Policy Optimization

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

An Evolutionary Game Study of Clean Heating Promotion Mechanisms under the Policy Regulation in China

An Evolutionary Game Study of Clean Heating Promotion Mechanisms under the Policy Regulation in China

The Dynamic Evolution Law of Coal Mine Workers’ Behavior Risk Based on Game Theory

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