Multidimensional Interests in Horizontal Intergovernmental Coordination: The Case of the German Bundesrat

Abstract

In the German Bundesrat, an arena of horizontal intergovernmental relations, sixteen L€ ander governments composed of approximately 170 governmental departments coordinate and negotiate their positions on federal motions. This article analyzes the coordination process and argues that the interests that the actors pursue, as well as the coordination strategies stemming from these interests, are less clear-cut than commonly assumed. Based on a novel network dataset collected by the author, evidence is found for sectoral, political party, and territorial coordination strategies.The main findings are first, that political party coordination in Germany is more frequent than territorial coordination but performs a structuring instead of a substantial function during the coordination process. Second, sectoral coordination mainly takes place at an early stage of the coordination process and is able to solve a bulk of coordination problems by drawing on expert knowledge.Processes of information exchange and coordination between central governments and sub-state governments are important processes in multilevel polities and determinants of successful multilevel policy-making. These occur not only vertically between the federal government and sub-state governments but also horizontally among sub-states. Poirier, Saunders, and Kincaid (2015, 4) argue that intergovernmental relations (IGR) are "the lifeblood of federalism in practice." This is especially true for cooperative federalism as it exists in the German Federal Republic with its system of joint decision-making (Behnke and Kropp 2016). One arena of intergovernmental relations in Germany is the Bundesrat.The German Bundesrat is the second chamber with territorial representation and an important institution in German politics. Its decisions often trigger or contribute to public discourse, for example, when in 2016 a decision regarding asylum policy and safe countries of origin led to intense public debate. In prior years, the Bundesrat initiated and led prominent attempts to forbid the extreme right party (NPD) or to exclude it from public party financing. Recently, it took a

Administrative Federalism

“…According to Article 50 of the Basic Law, '(t)he Länder shall participate through the Bundesrat in the legislation and administration of the Federation and in matters concerning the European Union'. This prescription implies a dual function: while the Bundesrat is a second chamber and, as such, involved in federal legislation, due to its composition and working mode, it also serves as a crucial arena for intergovernmental activities (Hegele 2017). The Bundesrat co-decides on every federal bill.…”

The impact of department structure on policy-making: How portfolio combinations affect interdepartmental coordination

“…During this process, the departments play a particularly crucial role since they are the ones carrying out these coordination tasks. In a comparative perspective, in German federalism and in the Bundesrat process particularly, sectoral coordination is an essential piece (Hegele, 2018;Wagener, 1979). This makes Germany a most likely case for finding an effect of portfolio combination on intergovernmental relations.…”

“…This makes Germany a most likely case for finding an effect of portfolio combination on intergovernmental relations. Due to constrained resources, departments cannot coordinate with all of the other individual L€ ander departments but strategically choose their coordination partners (Hegele, 2018). Thus, the German case as an exploratory case study allows one to observe the effect of organizational structure on a joint decision-making process.…”

Explaining bureaucratic power in intergovernmental relations: A network approach

“…In most scholarly analysis, IGR among politicians are considered, but these are usually supported by relations among public administrations (e.g., Johns et al ; Parry ; Hegele ). Public officials prepare the political IGR meetings, and just as in any other political process, exchange information, prepare and even negotiate decisions or take decisions on their own.…”

“…In the German Bundesrat , party politics matter (Lehmbruch ; Leunig and Träger ; Hegele ). Congruence with the federal level as power resource exists if the exact same parties constitute the sub‐state government as the federal government.…”