Multilocation and Parsimony

Mooney, Justin

doi:10.1002/tht3.379

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

2018

DOI: 10.1002/tht3.379

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Multilocation and Parsimony

Justin Mooney

Abstract: One objection to the thesis that multilocation is possible claims that, when combined with a preference for parsimonious theories, it leads to the absurd result that we ought to believe the material universe is composed of just one simple particle. I argue that this objection fails.

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Cited by 3 publications

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“…There are a 6 There is at least one argument against multilocation that is probably stronger if multilocation does not require time travel: the 'Problem of Parsimony' (Hudson 2005). See Mooney (2018a) n. 10.…”

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Multilocation Without Time Travel

Mooney

2019

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Multilocation Without Time Travel

Mooney

2019

Erkenn

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Is distinct location evidence of distinct objects? Multilocation and the problem of parsimony

Harmon

2023

Philosophical Books

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For an object to be multilocated is for it to wholly occupy disjoint spatial regions simultaneously. If multilocation is possible, it is possible that a multilocated particle is wholly located at 1080 distinct locations, such that it constitutes a particle‐for‐particle duplicate of the actual universe. Such a universe would presumably be perceptually identical to the actual universe. If we take multilocation as possible, we are thus presented with two accounts between which our perceptual evidence cannot adjudicate: one wherein the universe is constituted by many particles and another wherein it is constituted by one radically multilocated particle. Parsimony concerns dictate that the latter is the more rational to accept. Since this is absurd, we should reject that multilocation is possible. Mooney responds to the problem by arguing that distinct location is evidence of non‐identity, even if acceptance of the possibility of multilocation entails that this evidence is not decisive. If this is right, then the evidence favors a theory featuring many particles. In this paper, I contend that our commitment to taking distinct location as evidence of nonidentity is motivated by a more fundamental intuition that does not apply in the relevant context.

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There Are No Saints

Calosi

2022

Grazer Philos. Stud.

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Multilocation – the notion of an object being 18756735_00000147_text.pdfat two places – is a central notion in metaphysics. According to a widespread view, multilocation is problematic but metaphysically possible. In effect, it has been claimed that in a quantum world, multilocation is not simply possible but actual. This article provides a new argument against the latter claim: there is no quantum multilocation.

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Multilocation and Parsimony

Abstract: One objection to the thesis that multilocation is possible claims that, when combined with a preference for parsimonious theories, it leads to the absurd result that we ought to believe the material universe is composed of just one simple particle. I argue that this objection fails.

Cited by 3 publications

References 32 publications

Multilocation Without Time Travel

Multilocation Without Time Travel

Is distinct location evidence of distinct objects? Multilocation and the problem of parsimony

There Are No Saints

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