Multimarket contact and pricing: Evidence from the U.S. cement industry

Emissions trading with profit-neutral permit allocations

“…Given that the denominator of this expression is positive (by (14)), the expression is negative if and only if its numerator is positive, hence condition (16).…”

“…Indeed, 17 It is also straightforward to modify the proof of Proposition 5(i) to show that all firms that lose market share either all have higher than average emissions or lower than average market shares. E(Q * ) ≤ 1 is a necessary condition for (16) to hold for any distribution of market shares. For this reason and others, log-concavity is a common standing assumption in Cournot analysis.…”

“…16 If it holds for each firm i, then the Cournot oligopoly is (at least) locally a game of strategic substitutes. Obviously, condition (16) is stronger than (14).…”

“…However, in general, this fall is not shared equally across firms. To isolate the effect of demand curvature on the pattern 16 Using equation (47), it is straightforward to show that the slope of i's best response curve,…”

Testing Forbearance Experimentally: Duopolistic Competition of Conglomerate Firms

“…Parker and Röller (1997) and Busse (2000) found collusive behaviour in the US cellular telephone industry due to interdependency. Fernandez and Marrin (1998) showed effects of multimarket contracts on prices in the Spanish hotel industry and Jans and Rosenbaum (1997) in the US cement industry, respectively. Furthermore, firms with multimarket contacts are characterised by higher profits (Scott, 1982(Scott, , 1991, higher survival rates (Baum andKorn, 1996, 1999), lower R&D expenditures, fewer product introductions (Vonortas, 2000;Young et al, 2000), a lower sales growth (Greve, 2008) and a lower service quality (Prince and Simon, 2009).…”