Multimarket Contact in Health Insurance: Evidence from Medicare Advantage*

Lin, Haizhen; McCarthy, Ian

doi:10.1111/joie.12318

Cited by 4 publications

References 57 publications

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Local Competition, Multimarket Contact, and Product Quality: Evidence From Internet Service Provision

Wilson

2023

Rev Ind Organ

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I investigate the effect of competition on quality in the internet service provision industry: I examine both local competition within markets and multimarket contact among firms across markets. This industry offers an ideal setting, as quality is both objective and measurable. I use data from speedtest.net from 2008 to 2014 to estimate a reduced-form model of the effects of local competition and multimarket contact on realized consumer download speeds. I find that increased multimarket contact leads to decreased download speeds, which is consistent with the mutual forbearance hypothesis. I also find that duopolies lead to faster download speeds than do monopolies, but that further increases in the number of competitors decrease speeds.

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Local Competition, Multimarket Contact, and Product Quality: Evidence From Internet Service Provision

Wilson

2023

Rev Ind Organ

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New evidence on the impacts of cross‐market hospital mergers on commercial prices and measures of quality

Arnold,

King,

Fulton

et al. 2024

Health Services Research

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ObjectiveTo examine the impact of “cross‐market” hospital mergers on prices and quality and the extent to which serial acquisitions contribute to any measured effects.Data Sources2009–2017 commercial claims from the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI) and quality measures from Hospital Compare.Study DesignEvent study models in which the treated group consisted of hospitals that acquired hospitals further than 50 miles, and the control group was hospitals that were not part of any merger activity (as a target or acquirer) during the study period.Data Extraction MethodsWe extracted data for 214 treated hospitals and 955 control hospitals.Principal FindingsSix years after acquisition, cross‐market hospital mergers had increased acquirer prices by 12.9% (CI: 0.6%–26.6%) relative to control hospitals, but had no discernible impact on mortality and readmission rates for heart failure, heart attacks and pneumonia.For serial acquirers, the price effect increased to 16.3% (CI: 4.8%–29.1%). For all acquisitions, the price effect was 21.8% (CI: 4.6%–41.7%) when the target's market share was greater than the acquirer's market share versus 9.7% (CI: −0.5% to 20.9%) when the opposite was true. The magnitude of the price effect was similar for out‐of‐state and in‐state cross‐market mergers.ConclusionsAdditional evidence on the price and quality effects of cross‐market mergers is needed at a time when over half of recent hospital mergers have been cross‐market. To date, no hospital mergers have been challenged by the Federal Trade Commission on cross‐market grounds. Our study is the third to find a positive price effect associated with cross‐market mergers and the first to show no quality effect and how serial acquisitions contribute to the price effect. More research is needed to identify the mechanism behind the price effects we observe and analyze price effect heterogeneity.

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Multigame Contact: A Double-Edged Sword for Cooperation

Laferrière,

Montez,

Roux

et al. 2024

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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We study experimentally the effect of multigame contact on cooperation, with each subject playing a pair of indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemmas. Multigame contact is present if a subject plays both games with a single partner, and it is absent if each of the two games is played with a different partner. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, multigame contact does not increase overall cooperation rates. Nonetheless, multigame contact systematically affects behavior and outcomes, acting like a double-edged sword, in the sense that subjects link decisions across games and, consequently, mutual cooperation and mutual defection in both games become more likely. (JEL C72, C73, C92, D91)

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Multimarket Contact in Health Insurance: Evidence from Medicare Advantage*

Abstract: NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

Cited by 4 publications

References 57 publications

Local Competition, Multimarket Contact, and Product Quality: Evidence From Internet Service Provision

Local Competition, Multimarket Contact, and Product Quality: Evidence From Internet Service Provision

New evidence on the impacts of cross‐market hospital mergers on commercial prices and measures of quality

Multigame Contact: A Double-Edged Sword for Cooperation

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