Multiparty Evolutionary Game Model in Coal Mine Safety Management and Its Application

Lu, Rongwu; Wang, Xinhua; Yu, Hao; Li, Dan

doi:10.1155/2018/9620142

Cited by 31 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Therefore, EGT could solve the above limitation of traditional game theory, such as the information asymmetry issue, which is more in line with actual game scenarios [40]. EGT has been adopted by some studies to research the safety regulation of coal mines [41,42], food [43,44], aviation [45], internet [46,47], construction industry [48,49], environment [50][51][52] and supply chain [53]. In addition, some scholars have introduced EGT into the field of ridesharing research, such as the discussion on a dynamic game between platform companies and passengers [54,55].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Dynamic Evolution of Safety Regulation of the Ridesharing Industry under Social Media Participation

Sun

et al. 2020

Symmetry

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The emergence of ridesharing has spread against the background of the sharing economy. There have been a lot of controversies since the emergence of ridesharing, particularly regarding regulatory issues. The safety regulation of the ridesharing industry involves many parties, including governments, platform companies, and society at large. Currently, because of the influence of information asymmetry, it increases the uncertainty of governments’ regulation effect and the difficulty of making regulation measures. Meanwhile, social media, one of the most important forces of social regulation, has not paid enough attention to playing an appropriate role in the safety regulation of the ridesharing industry. Therefore, this study constructs an evolutionary game model between governments and platform companies that concerns the safety regulations of ridesharing passengers under social media participation. The influence path of social media is explored by model solution and numerical simulation. Our results indicate that social media participation has a positive impact on this safety regulation. Specifically, social media participation could reduce governments’ regulatory costs and encourage it to strictly regulate. The exposure of social media could bring losses to platform companies involved and promote platform companies’ investments in improving passengers’ safety. This study provides a decision basis for governments to introduce social media in the safety regulation of the ridesharing industry.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Dynamic Evolution of Safety Regulation of the Ridesharing Industry under Social Media Participation

Sun

et al. 2020

Symmetry

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“…Using game theory, Feng et al put forward the method of optimizing resource allocation [18]. In social science, Lu et al established a multi-party evolutionary game model [19]. Sun et al focused on the game between employer and worker mobility [20].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Research on Symmetry of Workers’ Behavior in Coal Mine Enterprises

Zhou

Cao

et al. 2019

Symmetry

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Statistics show that humans’ unsafe behaviors are the main cause of accidents. Because of the asymmetry of game benefits between managers and coal miners, the stability of workers’ behaviors is affected and unsafe behaviors are produced. In this paper, the symmetry of the behavior benefits of coal mine workers is studied, using game theory. In order to observe the dynamic game evolution process of behavioral stability, the paper establishes a system dynamics (SD) model and simulates it. The SD simulation results show that with the continuation of the game, when the benefits for safety managers and workers are asymmetric and the safety manager’s safety inspection benefits are less than the non-inspection benefits, the manager may not conduct safety inspections, which poses a great hidden danger to safety production. Through dynamic incentives to regulate the symmetry of income of coal mine safety managers and coal mine workers, the purpose of enhancing the stability of safety behavior is achieved. The research results of the paper have been successfully applied to coal mine enterprises.

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“…In the previous studies of evolutionary game model in coal mine safety management, we have obtained the following replicator dynamics [9,10] mine (player II), and safety regulatory departments of local government (player III). ( = 1, 2) is the penalty index (fine) when player I or player II has made mistakes (unsafe behaviors) and is checked out, respectively.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The game model contains too many variables and parameters, it is difficult to obtain the model's analytical solution [10]. In this paper, we mainly use numerical simulation method to analyze the evolutionary process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Stability of the Evolutionary Game System and Control Strategies of Behavior Instability in Coal Mine Safety Management

Wang

et al. 2019

Complexity

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In this paper, we try to find the right control method for the game behavior instability in coal mine safety management. Through the analysis and comparison of the system stability with inflexible and flexible costs and penalties, it can be concluded that the dynamical game system with flexible costs (incentive rewards) and flexible penalty mechanism can significantly reduce the dynamics of unsafe behaviors in coal mine safety supervision. A combined mechanism of incentive rewards and flexible penalty is put forward to improve the stability of the dynamical system and control the instability of behaviors effectively. The results of model simulation show that the combined mechanism has very good property and can optimize and control the instability of behaviors and strategies of the interested parties. Based on the theoretical conclusions, some control strategies and policy advice are proposed for the improvement of the system and measures of safety management for government departments.

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Multiparty Evolutionary Game Model in Coal Mine Safety Management and Its Application

Cited by 31 publications

References 31 publications

Dynamic Evolution of Safety Regulation of the Ridesharing Industry under Social Media Participation

Dynamic Evolution of Safety Regulation of the Ridesharing Industry under Social Media Participation

Evolutionary Game Research on Symmetry of Workers’ Behavior in Coal Mine Enterprises

Stability of the Evolutionary Game System and Control Strategies of Behavior Instability in Coal Mine Safety Management

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