Multiple Public Goods and Lottery Fund Raising

Moir, Robert

doi:10.1016/s0193-2306(06)11005-4

“…Interestingly, the authors find that when the per capita return of the global good exceeds that of the group-specific public good, subjects contribute more to the former but do not reduce their contributions to the other good. 8 Moir (2006) considers the effects of lotteries in financing multiple public goods and finds that when the lottery supports the less socially desirable public good, overall efficiency decreases. Bernasconi et al (2009) show that "unpacking" a linear public good into two identical and indistinguishable parts positively affects contributions.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Donor coordination in project funding: Evidence from a threshold public goods experiment

Corazzini

¹

,

Cotton

²

,

Valbonesi

³

2015

Journal of Public Economics

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“…Within this literature, our analysis is most related to the papers that consider the allocation of contributions across multiple goods (e.g. Blackwell and McKee, 2003;Moir, 2006;Bernasconi et al, 2009) and the papers which focus on threshold public goods that must reach a minimum level of total contributions before they return a benefit (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989;Andreoni and Gee, 2015). The threshold public good setting is considered a stylized description of donor contributions to charitable organizations and fundraising projects (Andreoni 1989(Andreoni , 1998.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

Corazzini

¹

,

Cotton

²

,

Reggiani

³

2019

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When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk miscoordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. We explore such considerations by extending the threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute to an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. We experimentally study the effects of the intermediary on contributions and successful public good funding. Results show that delegation increases overall contributions and public good success, but only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct funding received from donors to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary is detrimental, resulting in lower contributions, a higher probability of miscoordination, and lower payoffs.

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“…Within this literature, our analysis is most related to the papers that consider the allocation of contributions across multiple goods (e.g. Blackwell and McKee, 2003;Moir, 2006;Bernasconi et al, 2009) and the papers which focus on threshold public goods (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989;Andreoni and Gee, 2015), which is sometimes used to model donor contributions to charitable organizations and fundraising projects (Andreoni 1989(Andreoni , 1998.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Delegation And Coordination With Multiple Threshold Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

Corazzini¹,

Cotton²,

Reggiani³

2019

MUNI ECON WP

0

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When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk miscoordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. We explore such considerations by extending the threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute to an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. We experimentally study the effects of the intermediary on contributions and successful public good funding. Results show that delegation increases overall contributions and public good success, but only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct funding received from donors to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary is detrimental, resulting in lower contributions, a higher probability of miscoordination, and lower payoffs.

show abstract

Multiple Public Goods and Lottery Fund Raising

Cited by 4 publications

References 10 publications

Donor coordination in project funding: Evidence from a threshold public goods experiment

Donor coordination in project funding: Evidence from a threshold public goods experiment

Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

Delegation And Coordination With Multiple Threshold Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

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