Multiple Realizations

Shapiro, Lawrence A.

doi:10.2307/2678460

Cited by 242 publications

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“…We speak here about second-order or functional isomorphism. By definition, two systems that are functionally isomorphic are, in virtue of this fact, different realizations of the same kind (for detailed discussion see [462]). In other words, two different functionally isomorphic systems bring about the same function that defines the kind.…”

Section: Integration Of Space-time Of Brain and Mind Through Unified mentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural world physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time

Fingelkurts

Neves

2010

Physics of Life Reviews

168

233

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Concepts of space and time are widely developed in physics. However, there is a considerable lack of biologically plausible theoretical frameworks that can demonstrate how space and time dimensions are implemented in the activity of the most complex life-system -the brain with a mind. Brain activity is organized both temporally and spatially, thus representing space-time in the brain. Critical analysis of recent research on the space-time organization of the brain's activity pointed to the existence of so-called operational space-time in the brain. This space-time is limited to the execution of brain operations of differing complexity. During each such brain operation a particular short-term spatio-temporal pattern of integrated activity of different brain areas emerges within related operational space-time. At the same time, to have a fully functional human brain one needs to have a subjective mental experience. Current research on the subjective mental experience offers detailed analysis of space-time organization of the mind. According to this research, subjective mental experience (subjective virtual world) has definitive spatial and temporal properties similar to many physical phenomena. Based on systematic review of the propositions and tenets of brain and mind space-time descriptions, our aim in this review essay is to explore the relations between the two. To be precise, we would like to discuss the hypothesis that via the brain operational space-time the mind subjective space-time is connected to otherwise distant physical space-time reality.Key words: spatial, temporal, consciousness, cognition, operation, architectonics, EEG, field, metastability, physics, coordinative dynamics, self-organization, cortex.

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Section: Integration Of Space-time Of Brain and Mind Through Unified mentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural world physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time

Fingelkurts

Neves

2010

Physics of Life Reviews

168

233

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“…Several authors argue that functional or psychological properties are not multiply realizable-or that if functional or psychological properties are multiply realizable, then they are not natural kinds (Bechtel 2009;Bechtel and Mundale 1999;Bickle 2003Bickle , 2006P.M. Churchland 2007;Couch 2005;Kim 1992;Polger 2004Polger , 2009Shagrir 2008;Shapiro 2000Shapiro , 2004.…”

Section: Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience Via Multi-level Mechmentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

2011

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Synthese; Synthese is available online at:http://www.springer.com/philosophy/epistemology+and+philosophy+of+science/jou rnal/11229Abstract. We sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated with multilevel mechanistic explanations.1 This paper was refereed in two rounds. John Symons graciously arranged for a round of blind refereeing; thanks are due to him and the anonymous referees. In addition, thanks to those who refereed the paper non-blindly: Ken Aizawa, Robert Cummins, and Dan Weiskopf. Many thanks to audiences at the 2010 APA Pacific Division, Saint Louis University, and University of Missouri -Columbia. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES-0924527 to Gualtiero Piccinini. 2 Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience via Multi-Level Mechanistic ExplanationWhen psychologists explain behavior, the explanations typically make reference to causes that precede the behavior and make a difference to whether and how it occurs.For instance, they explain that Anna ducked because she saw a looming ball. By contrast, when psychologists explain psychological capacities such as stereopsis or working memory, they typically do so by showing that these complex capacities are made up of more basic capacities organized together. In this paper, we focus exclusively on the latter sort of explanation, which is usually referred to as functional analysis. We argue that such decompositional, constitutive explanations gain their explanatory force by describing mechanisms (even approximately and with idealization) and, conversely, that they lack explanatory force to the extent that they fail to describe mechanisms.In arguing for this point, we sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be and in some cases have been integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated with multilevel mechanistic explanations. 3The conclusion that functional analyses are mechanism sketches leads to a simple argument that psychological explanation is mechanistic. It is generally assumed that psychological explanation is functional-that it proceeds via t...

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“…Two main answers have been given. Functionalism 2.1.1 conjoins multiple realization with the so-called "flat" view of realization: when property P realizes property M , both P and M belong to the same individual [Kim 1998], [Shapiro 2000], [Shoemaker 2001]. So, for example, an object is a corkscrew because it can remove corks, and the properties of that physical object that realize its ability to remove corks include its hardness, its ability to apply a force via a lever, and so on.…”

Section: Functionalism 21mentioning

confidence: 99%

Get the Latest Upgrade: Functionalism 6.3.1

Maley¹,

Piccinini²

2013

philosophiascientiae

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Résumé : Le fonctionnalisme est une solution populaire au problème espritcorps. Il a un certain nombre de versions. Nous en exposons certaines parmi les principales, en énumérant une partie de leurs caractéristiques les plus importantes ainsi que certains « bugs » qui les ont entachées. Nous présentons comment les différentes variantes sont liées. Nombreux ont été les pessimistes à propos des perspectives du fonctionnalisme, mais la plupart des critiques ne tiennent pas compte des dernières mises à jour. Nous finissons en suggé-rant une variante du fonctionnalisme qui fournit une description complète de l'esprit.Abstract: Functionalism is a popular solution to the mind-body problem. It has a number of versions. We outline some of the major releases of functionalism, listing some of their important features as well as some of the bugs that plagued these releases. We outline how different versions are related. Many have been pessimistic about functionalism's prospects, but most criticisms have missed the latest upgrades. We end by suggesting a version of functionalism that provides a complete account of the mind.The mind-body problem is the problem of how the mental relates to the physical. We know they are intimately involved: the physical affects the mental when our body is injured and we feel pain, or when we drink alcohol and feel intoxicated; the mental affects the physical when we decide to retrieve a book and reach for it, or when we perceive the signal to cross the street and begin walking. The first solution that comes to mind is dualism: the view that the mental and physical are two different kinds of thing. While dualism is intuitively appealing, it faces such serious difficulties (how to account for the intimate connections between the mental and the physical, how the mental and the physical could possibly interact, etc.) that it's been mostly abandoned. The other option is monism, according to which the mental and the physical

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Multiple Realizations

Cited by 242 publications

References 0 publications

Natural world physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time

Natural world physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

Get the Latest Upgrade: Functionalism 6.3.1

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