Multiunit Auctions

Abstract

Abstract. We survey experimental research on multiunit auctions with an emphasis on topics that may be of a unifying interest to experimental, as well as theoretical and empirical economists. Topics include static and dynamic multiunit auctions; combinatorial auctions and efficient auction design; simultaneous and sequential auctions; bidder asymmetry and endogenous entry, and collusion in auctions. We also discuss behavioral regularities observed in multiunit auction experiments.

Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: An Experimental Investigation

“…Since in our setting the theory predicts increasing prices, observing constant prices is consistent with the bias in that literature. 2 This means that, instead of self-selection, the risk-aversion explanation proposed in [7] and tested in [8] could potentially explain the behavior of our subjects. While we do not have enough data to test and disentangle between these two theories, the fact that our most aggressive subjects make very small or even negative profits in the auctions of the first and second goods suggests that only implausible levels of risk aversion could justify their behavior.…”

“…In other words, and just like in the one-shot auctions, the expected payoff of bidders in each period is identical across mechanisms. Combining (1) with (2) and (3) with (4), the utility in period t can be rewritten as:…”

“…These are auctions with capacity constraints, since obtaining a good saturates the capacity of the participant for a time, restricting the possibility to bid in an auction. In a recent survey, they are called "multi-unit auctions with single-unit demand" [2].…”

Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence

“…Generally, collusion in auctions emerges either through repeated interaction between bidders or through bidding that occurs over multiple objects (Agranov and Yariv, 2015). In multi-unit auctions bidders may coordinate their strategies in an attempt to split the objects for sale and reach a more profitable outcome for themselves than that originating out of a competitive situation (Kwasnica and Sherstyuk, 2013). …”

“…Collusion in complex simultaneous auctions of multiple goods has not yet been properly examined for mechanisms with more than only a few objects 2 for sale (Kwasnica and Sherstyuk, 2013). On the one hand, large scale auctions may offer enough possible combinations for bidders to find profitable collusive allocation, but on the other hand it can create coordination problem that is too complicated for colluding bidders to cooperate successfully (Kwasnica and Sherstyuk, 2013).…”