In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to
choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on
the voters’ approval preferences over the candidates. While
this problem has attracted significant attention in recent years,
the incentives for voters to participate in an election for a
given ABC voting rule have been neglected so far. This paper
is thus the first to explicitly study this property, typically called
participation, for ABC voting rules. In particular, we show
that all ABC scoring rules even satisfy group participation,
whereas most sequential rules severely fail participation. We
furthermore explore several escape routes to the impossibility
for sequential ABC voting rules: we prove for many sequential
rules that (i) they satisfy participation on laminar profiles, (ii)
voters who approve none of the elected candidates cannot
benefit by abstaining, and (iii) it is NP-hard for a voter to
decide whether she benefits from abstaining