Muted differences: Entrenching legitimacy of the Bosnian statehood?

Abstract

The UNDP report The Silent Majority Speaks (2007) demonstrates widespread consent and a popular desire for change while promoting a single state with strong regions as a compromise model for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Surprisingly, our own research (2009) on political legitimacy reveals quite the opposite tendencies, where political entities such as the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS) more often drift apart than merge together. What strikes us is the fact that the FBiH, which advocates a more integrated state, does not necessarily have more legitimate grounds for achieving that goal than the secessionist counterclaim of RS in its own right. The two entities remain worlds apart on a range of issues and agree only on rather abstract principles of an ideal political order.

Failed statebuilding versus peace formation

“…The result should not be such as that in Bosnia–Herzegovina where the Office of the High Representative, European Union, UN, and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe have driven statebuilding without gaining a broad consensus on the ground (see Berg and Solvak, 2011); in Kosovo where a dominant group has taken over the institutions of state, thus marginalising other minorities, including Serbs, with international support; or in Afghanistan, where an embryonic state has been limited to the capital and has failed to make headway in negotiating with the Taliban, who have continued their violent and discriminatory strategies. In these cases, local knowledge was often ignored, capacities were not identified and supported, and partnerships were limited and selected on the basis of external interests rather than with the aim of achieving a sophisticated peace.…”

Parent StatesversusSecessionist Entities: Measuring Political Legitimacy in Cyprus, Moldova and Bosnia & Hercegovina

“…Moreover, the Federation of Bosnia & Hercegovina has been in a position to play an integrative role and thus resembles a parent state, whereas the Republika Srpska could qualify as a secessionist entity. In many respects, the Republika Srpska of today is the successor to the de facto state that existed in 1992-1995 and which was not dissolved by the Dayton Accords but was instead frozen in the form of a 'semi-independent entity' for Bosnian Serbs and separated from the Federation of Bosnia & Hercegovina territories by an Inter-Entity Boundary Line (Zahar 2004;Kostovicova 2004;Berg & Solvak 2011). Moreover, the 'Kosovo precedent' seems to have revitalised the notion of an attempted breakaway in the minds of Bosnian Serbs.…”