Offered here is Part 2 of a two-part critical survey of recent work in philosophy on divine hiddenness. Part 1 surveyed recent development of the discussion initiated by my 1993 book on the subject. Here, I examine some related work that expands the scope of the hiddenness discussion. Some of the enlargements take further the discussion of Stephen Maitzen's work on the demographics of theism. Others introduce new hiddenness problems and ways of dealing with them. A third category of new work urges theological constraints, of one sort or another, on hiddenness reasoning, thus raising new methodological issues.
| INTRODUCTIONThis is the second of two articles critically surveying recent work on divine hiddenness in philosophy. More than 60 papers and books dealing with hiddenness themes have appeared in the past six years, since an earlier survey article of mine was published (Schellenberg, 2010). Realizing that I could not address all of these and wishing to enable a reasonable treatment of those I did include, I decided to break my survey into two parts. Part 1 (Schellenberg, 2017) looked at recent philosophical work on the hiddenness argument for atheism descended from my book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Schellenberg, 1993). Now, in Part 2, I consider recent work not easily seen as belonging to that stream of discussion but related to it by family resemblance-work on arguments about hiddenness other than my argument, some of them quite new, and work that, though sometimes applied to my argument, more decidedly than any that came before seeks insight on a range of hiddenness issues from theology, raising a number of methodological issues as it does so.
| NEW WORK ON THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THEISMTen years ago, Stephen Maitzen expanded the number of hiddenness issues to be considered by arguing that the highly uneven or lopsided distribution of theistic belief in the world is much more likely on naturalism than on theism (Maitzen, 2006). This problem he called a problem about the "demographics" of theism. A recent reply to Maitzen comes from T. J. Mawson (2012). Maitzen had argued that responses appealing to free will are inapplicable to the demographics problem. But Mawson observes that neglected in Maitzen's discussion of free will is the fact that, through the exercise of free will, people can affect how much and where belief in God spreads, with an uneven