Mutual Interventions in Africa

Abstract

Global datasets on interstate armed conflict suggest that African states clash with each other rarely and only for short periods. This research note shows that existing datasets paint a misleading picture. In fact, African states fight each other more often and for longer than is commonly thought, but they do so by mutually intervening in each other's intrastate conflicts. Instead of relying solely on their own armed forces, they support their rival's armed opposition groups. Such mutual interventions—most prevalent in Africa but also evident in other regions—thus span the boundaries of interstate and intrastate conflict. As a result, they have been largely overlooked by conflict scholars. Our note conceptualizes mutual intervention as a distinct form of interstate conflict, comparing and contrasting it with concepts like proxy war, competitive intervention, and international rivalry. The note then presents the first systematic survey of mutual interventions across the African continent. We identify twenty-three cases between 1960 and 2010 and demonstrate that they typically ended independently of their associated intrastate conflicts. We conclude with a research agenda that involves studying the onset, duration, termination, and consequences of mutual interventions, including collecting data on mutual interventions outside Africa to explore cross-regional differences.

Combat, commitment, and the termination of Africa’s mutual interventions

“…A similar scenario contributed to Somalia’s support for Somali rebels in Ethiopia. In other cases, ethnic solidarity appears to have been of secondary importance (Duursma and Tamm, 2021: 1082). However, transborder ethnic ties have been found to make the termination of support to rebels less likely (Karlén, 2019: 744); this factor should thus make the Chad–Sudan mutual intervention a harder case for our rationalist explanation.…”

“… * An asterisk indicates that the state provided troop support for at least part of the mutual intervention; † a dagger indicates that the rebel group received support over the course of the mutual intervention but not in its first year. Details on how these data were collected are provided in Duursma and Tamm (2021). …”

“…In particular, we investigate how different combinations of combat outcomes in the two interlocked intrastate conflicts affect the severity of commitment problems and thus the likelihood of a successful settlement. Understanding these battlefield linkages and their consequences is of major importance for the study of conflict in Africa: mutual interventions have been more common and more protracted than conventional interstate conflicts and they have made intrastate conflicts far more deadly (Duursma and Tamm, 2021: 1078). Mutual interventions are distinct from better-studied competitive interventions, in which one rival state supports the government while the other supports the rebels in the same intrastate conflict (Anderson, 2019; Schulhofer-Wohl, 2020).…”

“… SSLM: Southern Sudan Liberation Movement; ELF: Eritrean Liberation Front; FLNC: Congolese National Liberation Front; FNLA: National Liberation Front of Angola; UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; ANC: African National Congress; SWAPO: South West Africa People’s Organization; PF: Patriotic Front; SSDF: Somali Salvation Democratic Front; SNM: Somali National Movement; WSLF: Western Somali Liberation Front; SPLM/A: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army; EPLF: Eritrean People’s Liberation Front; OLF: Oromo Liberation Front; TPLF: Tigray People’s Liberation Front; EPRDF: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front; LRA: Lord’s Resistance Army; WNBF: West Nile Bank Front; ADF: Allied Democratic Forces; UNRF II: Uganda National Rescue Front II; NDA: National Democratic Alliance; EIJM—AS: Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement’s Abu Suhail faction; ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front; AFDL: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire; ALiR: Army for the Liberation of Rwanda; CNDD: National Council for the Defense of Democracy; FLEC-FAC: Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda—Armed Forces of Cabinda; FDLR: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda; RCD: Congolese Rally for Democracy; CNDP: National Congress for the Defense of the People; MLC: Movement for the Liberation of Congo; RCD-ML: Congolese Rally for Democracy—Liberation Movement; CNDD-FDD: National Council for the Defense of Democracy—Forces for the Defense of Democracy; Palipehutu-FNL: Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People—Forces for the National Liberation; LURD: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy; RFDG: Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea; MJP: Movement for Justice and Peace; MPIGO: Popular Movement of the Ivorian Great West; MODEL: Movement for Democracy in Liberia; JEM: Justice and Equality Movement; SLM/A: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army; NRF: National Redemption Front; FUCD: United Front for Democratic Change; RAFD: Rally of Democratic Forces; UFDD: Union of Forces for Democracy and Development; AN: National Alliance; UFR: Union of Resistance Forces. * An asterisk indicates that the state provided troop support for at least part of the mutual intervention; † a dagger indicates that the rebel group received support over the course of the mutual intervention but not in its first year. Details on how these data were collected are provided in Duursma and Tamm (2021). …”

“… 1. Mutual interventions have been most prevalent in Africa, but they have also occurred in Asia and the Middle East. This article focuses on Africa because detailed data on mutual interventions in other regions do not currently exist (Duursma and Tamm, 2021: 1085). …”