2009
DOI: 10.1017/s0003055409990104
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Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy

Abstract: Do voters effectively hold elected officials accountable for policy decisions? Using data on natural disasters, government spending, and election returns, we show that voters reward the incumbent presidential party for delivering disaster relief spending, but not for investing in disaster preparedness spending. These inconsistencies distort the incentives of public officials, leading the government to underinvest in disaster preparedness, thereby causing substantial public welfare losses. We estimate that $1 s… Show more

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Cited by 660 publications
(486 citation statements)
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References 60 publications
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“…Although constituents can punish failed emergency responses, such policies should ameliorate the consequences of natural disasters and reduce the risk of removal from office compared to non-democratic regimes. Our theoretical approach is therefore closer to Flores and Smith (2013) than Healy and Malhotra (2009). Consequently, we test the following hypotheses:…”
Section: Climate Impacts Political Regime and Leader Survivalmentioning
confidence: 85%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Although constituents can punish failed emergency responses, such policies should ameliorate the consequences of natural disasters and reduce the risk of removal from office compared to non-democratic regimes. Our theoretical approach is therefore closer to Flores and Smith (2013) than Healy and Malhotra (2009). Consequently, we test the following hypotheses:…”
Section: Climate Impacts Political Regime and Leader Survivalmentioning
confidence: 85%
“…On the other hand, voters also reward competent handling of crises in the aftermath of natural disasters (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011). This creates incentives for democratic leaders to reduce, not increase, disaster preparedness (Healy and Malhotra 2009). Taken together, these findings suggest that natural disasters may constitute a political opportunity for skilled democratic leaders, but constituents will punish a lack of preparation or failed emergency response.…”
Section: Climate Impacts Political Regime and Leader Survivalmentioning
confidence: 97%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…For instance, Healy and Malhotra (2009) analyze US 1984 to 2004 county-level data to examine the impact of spending on prevention versus disaster relief on election outcomes. They find that preparedness spending is effective: a 1 % increase in preparedness spending is associated with a 0.134 % reduction in disaster damage, whereas relief spending has no impact on future damage.…”
Section: Why Resilience Differs Across Actorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The general finding is that increases in education, trade openness, financial sector strength, coupled with better institutions and stable democratic regimes help reduce the impact of disasters. A few papers have also explored the link between political accountability and damages from natural disasters (Besley and Burgess, 2002;Eisensee andStromberg, 2007 andHealy andMalhotra, 2009) finding that greater accountability tends to lower damages.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%