Nagorny Karabakh conflict: Prospects for conflict transformation

Abstract

The article explores the current stalemate in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, and perspectives for conflict transformation. As the conflict has remained dormant for more than 20 years, the political systems of the countries engaged in the conflict have adjusted to the conflict situation. The conflict is often used by the political elites in order to legitimize their power, consolidate support, marginalize opponents, and neutralize democratizing pressures. Since the status quo serves the interests of the authorities, the ruling regimes do not have strong incentives to seek conflict resolution. In these conditions, conflict transformation approaches are considered a necessary means to deal with the conflict. Given that political elites have little incentive to implement such transformation, civil society actors come increasingly to the fore. Only through multitrack initiatives supported by civil society actors, we argue, can conflict transformation practices advance and subsequently bring peace to the region.

Legitimizing the Separatist Cause: Nation-building in the Eurasiande factoStates

“…As with Transnistria and Abkhazia, the history writing of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan is highly politicized, contributing to a “radicalization of mutual mistrust” (Ayunts, Zakaryan, and Zolyan 2016, 1). “Armenians and Azerbaijanis developed ethno-histories and myths of ethnogenesis to justify their territorial claims to the homeland of which Karabakh was an inseparable part” (Geukjian 2012, 20; see also Laycock 2020).…”

Enduring Rivalry and Conflict Transformation: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh/Ձգձգվող Հակամարտություն Եվ Հակամարտությունների Փոխակերպում. Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի Դեպքի Շուրջ/Длительное Соперничество И Трансформация Конфликта: Случай Нагорного Карабаха

“…Both conflict transformation theories and the ER framework emphasize the interests of the ruling elites as central actors of rivalries when it comes to reaching a peace agreement. Both schools argue that the fear of ruling elites of the domestic backfire to their regime as a response to a conciliatory deal (in forms of coups or losses in future election cycles) is a major impediment to conflict resolution Diehl et al, 2005;Ayunts, Zolyan, & Zakaryan, 2016). Unwilling to face these pressures, the elites then turn this liability into an asset for further consolidating their grip on power.…”

“…The centrality of the conflict in domestic politics has spiralled up to a level that, using the terms of Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi, it has become a "zero-sum test for each state's legitimizing ideology" (Diehl et al, 2005, p. 35). With this backdrop, Ayunts et al (2016) do not consider the possibility of actor transformation -as well as of rule and issue transformation -since the leaders were not likely to compromise their political capital that would be at stake. Nevertheless, one of the key actors of the process has changed since that writing, as in 2018 "Velvet Revolution" in Armenia briefly Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan from power and brought Nikol Pashinyan and his party to the leadership of the state.…”

Multiple borders of Nagorno-Karabakh

“…They argue that, objectively, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan can afford to start a new large-scale war that would inevitably lead to unacceptable material losses and a breakdown in interaction with many key players (Ozan 2008;Babayev et al 2020). However, political elites are actively using the conflict to legitimize their power and marginalize opponents (Minasyan 2011;Ayunts et al 2016). The Karabakh conflict is of paramount importance in the political life and evolution of the identity of the citizens of Armenia and Azerbaijan.…”