Narratives of nationalism in Eritrea: research and revisionism*. Dedicated to the memory of Alex Naty (1957-2003)

Abstract

Eritrean politics is increasingly captured in competing narratives of nationalism. 'Official' narratives emphasize Eritrea's purported stability, orderliness, and uniqueness. This discourse defends and supports the current government's policies. In contrast, recent research challenges those policies, and contributes to a nationalist counter-narrative. This article seeks to investigate the discursive power of conventional narratives and the implications of new research for accounts of state and nation-building in Eritrea. The Eritrean case -one of the newest states in the worldintersects with and informs a number of broader debates on nationalism and nationbuilding: the impact of globalization, secessionism, and war as well as the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism. The penetration of state and nation-building projects into every sector of Eritrean life means that all social research is deeply politicised. Journalists and researchers have long been key players in the contested process of conceptualising Eritrean nation-hood, and this continues in the postliberation period. Research thus both buttresses and challenges official discourses, even where it is not explicitly framed in terms of nationalism.

From rebel governance to state consolidation – Dynamics of loyalty and the securitisation of the state in Eritrea

“…While parts of the ruling elite have lost their legitimacy and the politics of coercion have made dissenting voices impossible and thus resulted in either (subversive) disengagement or exit from the country, loyalty to the project of Eritrean state consolidation is still paramount in multiple ways. The youth who leave Eritrea in their thousands are not unwilling to participate in the state building project: they object to be treated simply as foot soldiers without a stake in the future and the hope to fulfil some of their ambitions (Dorman, 2005;Reid, 2009). They have been brought up with the promise of a post-liberation state enshrined in a progressive but unimplemented constitution.…”

“…Along the same lines, a number of studies have concluded that while diaspora Eritreans might question the official, PFDJ-proclaimed narrative of Eritrean citizenship obligations, at the same time new multiple narratives have emerged that cement a strong sense of national identity and commitment to the development of the state (see Arnone, 2008;Bernal, 2004Bernal, , 2006Conrad, 2006a;Dorman, 2005;Hepner, 2003Hepner, , 2008Hepner, , 2009Tesfagiorgios, 2004;Wei Lynn, 2009). The same is true for the Eritrean refugee population in Israel.…”

“…Fifty-four percent of the Eritrean population is below the age of 20 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010). This generation has no concrete experience of the armed struggle that lies behind the foundation of the state; thus in the PFDJ's understanding it needs to be socialised into a culture of sacrifice (see also Dorman, 2005). The major mobilisation drive is the nationwide national service campaign introduced in 1995 in order to pass the 'culture of martyrdom' (Tesfai, 2002) onto the next generation.…”

The Struggling State

“…Postliberation or revolutionary regimes merge a progressive and developmental vision for societal transformation with a kind of coercive and intolerant politics that, as I show in the next chapter, winds up eroding the legitimacy that enabled the revolution in the first place. Thus, revolutionary movements can lead to political hierarchies and a particularly closed political climate; in their efforts to produce a society that is revolutionary, they also emphasize controlling the population over producing positive emotional attachments to the nation, all of which has been the case in Eritrea (Connell 2011;Dorman 2005).…”

“…While officially leaving traditional forms of governance intact, it also appointed to each village or municipality a centrally appointed administrator who, in practice, was more powerful than traditional leaders. Following the border war, these administrators were more often than not military personnel who had a great deal of power but little legitimacy (Dorman 2005(Dorman , 2006.…”